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ABSTRACT

Author: McCarty, Tanner, J. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: August 2018
Title: Three Essays on the Economics of Specialized Agricultural Products: Equilibrium
Contract Structure and Firm Boundary under Uncertainty and Sunk Costs
Committee Chair: Juan Pablo Sesmero
This dissertation contains three essays exploring how contractual form endogenously responds to
uncertainty and irreversibility within a market for specialized agricultural products. It additionally
explores the impact that this resulting contractual form has on rent and return distribution along
the vertical supply chain. I accomplish this using a novel framework that meshes complete
contracting and real options analysis. The first essay explores how equilibrium contract structure
between an incumbent buyer and a seller considering entry into production of a specialized
agricultural product endogenously responds to uncertainty and irreversibility. Results suggest that
contract structure is sensitive to both the level and source of volatility. Additionally, the buyer can
more effectively respond to some sources of volatility than others. The second essay relaxes the
assumption of an incumbent buyer and examines how the equilibrium contract structure
endogenously changes under varying levels of uncertainty and irreversibility when both the buyer
and seller are considering entry. The third essay uses the previously mentioned framework to
examine cost effectives of existing subsidies aimed at developing the cellulosic biofuel industry.
Comparing results from essay’s one and two showcases that contracts offered to seller’s
considering production of a specialized agricultural product will vary substantially depending on
whether the buying firm offering it is an incumbent or considering entry itself. Incumbent firms
have a strategic advantage in being able to offer a contract that transfers a greater amount of risk
to themselves while lowering a seller’s premium on entry. Results from essay three indicate that

xii
current subsidies designed to develop the cellulosic biofuel industry are not cost effective in their
current form and that government resources could be used more efficiently through either
establishment subsidies or yearly fixed payments to participants. Additionally, subsidies paid to
the plant are generally more effective at inducing entry than payments to the seller.
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INTRODUCTION

Modern agriculture has undergone, and is continuing to experience, a shift from commodity based
products to increasingly differentiated ones (Adjemian, et al., 2016, Crespi, et al., 2012, Sexton,
2012). Buyers are increasingly paying close attention to numerous attributes of the products they
acquire, including crops that have historically been commodity crops (e.g. corn). Some of these
attributes include, but are not limited to, fair trade, non-GMO, chemical-free, organic, locally
grown, sustainably grown, genetic selection, and vitamin-enhancement. This shift has important
impacts in the market. For instance, a breakfast cereal manufacturer that advertises their product
as using ingredients that are locally grown, sustainably grown, and GMO free, will only buy corn
that fulfills these criteria. As a result, the vertical supply chain of this specialized agricultural
product (SAP) will consist of a limited number of input suppliers following specific production
practices (for which specific capital assets are often required), and a limited number of firms that
choose to buy it and process it into a downstream differentiated product (buyers). Therefore, these
specialized agricultural products tend to be more thinly traded than their commoditized
counterparts. As a result, SAP industries typically rely on vertical coordination rather than spot
markets. This vertical coordination is often attained through contracting.
Contracting gains additional significance when the capital investment for producing that
agricultural good is product-specific. For example, imagine an egg farmer that is considering
converting their standard egg operation into a cage free process. This shift requires costly capital
investment in the form of new housing for the chickens. Outside of the industry, this housing does
not have much value should the production of cage free eggs become unprofitable in the future.
Because of these risks, the more asset specific or irreversible an investment is, the more important
it is to ensure there will be an end buyer for that product.
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Another important component of SAP markets is the volatility of future prices for a given
good. A farmer considering organic certification for produce will experience volatile prices in the
future from both the value of the crop itself and people’s changes in tastes and preferences over
time. This profitability will be especially volatile due to the thin market these products are sold in.
All else equal, sellers weakly prefer stable revenue and buyers weakly prefer stable input cost.
Contracting helps both parties achieve their goal.
The previous paragraphs highlight three important characterizations of many SAP markets.
1: The trading environment between the buyer and seller is organized through some type of vertical
coordination, i.e. contracting. 2: Investment into production of differentiated agricultural products
contains some degree of asset specificity “irreversibility”. 3: The future profitability of these
products is volatile “uncertain”. These properties of markets for SAPs are non-trivial, and have
important implications for how the markets associated with them function. Additionally these
properties interact with one another which affect these markets in ways that have not been
previously explored. Understanding how SAP markets operate is imperative to understanding
where agriculture is headed.
This dissertation combines principles of contract theory and real options to examine how
these features will likely affect the contract structure under which these products are traded in
equilibrium, and the subsequent distribution of risk and return along the vertical supply chain.
In particular, we formally characterize the optimal contract in this trading environment as
some convex combination of four types of payments: opportunity cost indexing, performance
payment, fixed acreage payment, and exit penalties. We then generate comparative statics that
clarify how changes in key primitives affect mechanism design and the way risk and returns are
distributed. We illustrate the empirical relevance of our framework by applying it to the

3
relationship between an operational cellulosic biofuel plant and a farmer considering the
production of perennial energy crops.
The first essay in Chapter 2 applies this framework to the problem of an incumbent buyer
trying to induce entry of a seller to produce a specialized agricultural product. Examples of this
could include a an winery convincing a farmer to cultivate a specific type of grape or a cellulosic
biofuel plant attempting to incentivize farmer entry into growing Miscanthus after their first round
of contracts is up. Our analysis indicates that the equilibrium contract structure can respond in
counterintuitive ways to plausible changes in market primitives. In particular, lump sum payments
can act as strategic complements to renegotiation penalties. Moreover the equilibrium contract
structure is sensitive to both the source and level of volatility in the trading environment. Finally,
we find that buyers are more effective at achieving high returns under some sources of volatility
than others.
The second essay in Chapter 3 looks at the problem of equilibrium contracting between a
seller and buyer both considering entry into the specialized agricultural product supply chain.
Examples of this could include a business considering simultaneously investing in a winery and
contracting with a farmer to grow a desired varietal or a cellulosic biofuel producer simultaneously
considering building a plant and contracting with a farmer to grow Miscanthus. The framework of
essay one is extended to include an endogenously defined participation constraint for the buyer.
Contracts must now be attractive enough to overcome both parties option value of waiting for more
information. Results indicate that equilibrium contract structure varies significantly after including
the buyer’s endogenously defined participation constraint. Buyer’s will offer significantly riskier
contracts, (from their perspective) if they are already in operation and looking to obtain new inputs
than if they are also considering entry themselves.
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Essay three in Chapter 4 looks at the empirical situation in essays one and two, investment
(or lack of) along the cellulosic biofuel supply chain. It looks at the instruments that government
policy can use to induce investment in the most cost effective way possible. Payment types
included within the biomass crop assistance program (BCAP) are evaluated along with other
payment types found within the literature such as establishment subsidies, and subsidized
insurance. Results indicate that the BCAP program has not offered subsidies that are cost-effective.
The most cost effective policies the government could use would be offering establishment
subsidies to the biofuel plants or acting as an insurance agent that would allow for farmers to
receive opportunity cost indexed payments without subjecting the biofuel plant to any additional
risk.
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THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIALIZED
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS: CONTRACT FARMING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY AND SUNK COSTS

2.1

Introduction

Contracts have a long tradition in agriculture. Yet, adaptations of contract theory to accommodate
key features of agricultural markets have lagged behind the empirical importance of contract
farming (Wu 2014). Moreover, increased specialization exacerbates the asset specificity
(production requires costly capital investments that are specific to the product in question) and
uncertainty (thinly traded markets are more noisy and vulnerable to hold-up among traders)
associated with producing a given product. This leads to the use of contracts for coordination
among stages of the vertical supply chain. Notice, therefore, that contrary to many other
applications in which contracts emerge to overcome asymmetric information (i.e. moral hazard
and adverse selection), contracts in these trading environments are necessary to secure
commitments from buyers and sellers in a highly volatile industry with large sunk costs. However,
little attention has been paid to the role of uncertainty and sunk costs in shaping contract structures
that may emerge in markets for specialized agricultural products. This fact has limited agricultural
economists’ ability to incorporate key features of modern agricultural markets into their analyses.
We develop a conceptual framework accommodating three key features of production and trading
in specialized agricultural markets. First, the product is thinly traded; therefore coordination to
secure the commitment of the buyer and the seller is necessary and attained through contracting.
Second, production of a specialized agricultural product involves some degree of asset specificity
(i.e. sunk costs). Finally, profitability is subject to some degree of uncertainty.
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We employ the framework developed in this study to formally characterize the structure of
equilibrium contracts in specialized agricultural markets, and its implications for the distribution
of risk and returns along the vertical supply chain. We then generate comparative statics describing
how the structure of the equilibrium contract and the associated distribution of risk and returns
vary in response to changes in key primitives (source and level of uncertainty). We illustrate the
empirical relevance of the framework by applying it to the case of a biofuel firm contracting with
a seller to grow a perennial energy crop. This application is particularly fertile for a number of
reasons. First, the market for perennial energy crops is extremely thin. Second, this is a market
with a considerable amount of sunk costs and uncertainty. Third, while policies to support
development of the vertical supply chain have been in place for a period of time, deployment has
lacked behind the government’s target. Therefore, our framework helps elucidate some of the key
factors behind the ineffectiveness of biofuel policies.
Our analysis reveals that the equilibrium contract structure responds in non-trivial,
sometimes counterintuitive ways to changes in key market primitives. This underscores the
importance of recognizing the endogenous nature of the contract structure in thinly traded markets.
We also find that complex contract structures can emerge in equilibrium whereby buyers use a
combination of performance payments, lump sum payments, opportunity cost indexing of
performance payments, and renegotiation penalties. The importance of this contractual complexity
is emphasized by the fact that contract terms can be used as substitutes or complements to one
another depending on the source and level of volatility in the market.

2.2

Literature Review

Given the importance of uncertainty in agricultural production, it is not surprising that many
studies have examined how the level of payment and risk sellers are subject to affect their
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willingness to grow specialized crops (Altman, et al., 2015, Bocqueho and Jacquet, 2010,
Sherrington, et al., 2008). When combined with large sunk costs, uncertainty creates a reluctance
to invest (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). This reluctance is caused by an option value of waiting for
more information, which makes the potential investor demand a premium before engaging. This
has made the framework called real options analysis (Dixit and Pindick 1994) a popular area of
research for specialized agricultural products in general, and perennial crops in particular (Luong
and Tauer, 2006, Musshoff, 2012, Price and Wetzstein, 1999, Regan, et al., 2015, Richards and
Green, 2003, Schatzki, 2003, Song, et al., 2011, Wolbert-Haverkamp and Musshoff, 2013). These
studies have found price premium caused by the option value of waiting for more information to
be between 10% and 80% above a traditional net present value threshold for risk neutral
individuals.
While important contributions have been made explaining how sellers respond to uncertainty
and irreversibility inherent within these markets, the real options literature has largely ignored how
alternative contract arrangements prevalent within these markets can shape participation decisions
through its influence on uncertainty and irreversibility. A number of studies have focused on how
various pre-determined contract arrangements affect sellers’ willingness to cultivate specialized
crops (Fewell, et al., 2016, Golecha and Gan, 2016, Larson, et al., Yang, et al., 2015). Another
strand of the contract literature discusses how common features of specialized crop markets will,
in general, affect the contracting outcome (Alexander, et al., 2012, Viana and Perez, 2013). These
studies point out that contracts for specialized crops must satisfy a participation constraint, an
incentive compatibility constraint and a renegotiation proof constraint. Neither of these strands of
literature, however, formally characterize the contracting structure likely to emerge in equilibrium
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as a function of market attributes. Nor do they explicitly incorporate the role of uncertainty and
irreversibility in the contract’s participation constraint.
Some attempts have been made to integrate real options and contracts. Both WolbertHaverkamp, et al. (2014) and (Maung and Foster, 2002) modeled a situation in which the
participation constraint of a contract is the solution of a real options model of investment. Li and
Kouvelis (1999) also examined the effect of alternative contract structures on a supplier’s
participation in trading. None of these studies, however, endogenize the contract structure. Stark
(2000) and Grenadier and Wang (2005) did endogenize contract structures. In particular, they
derived contracts that would induce agents (managers) within a firm to implement the investment
rule that would maximize the firm’s profit accounting for the value of waiting. Brach (2003) and
Philippon and Sannikov (2007) also considered endogenous contracts in situations in which the
value of waiting to make a partially irreversible investment is caused by moral hazard. However,
studies that endogenize contracting outcomes did not explicitly model the input supplier
participation constraint. Specifically, these papers consider contracting between parties that are
already trading. This is in contrast with our trading environment in which the objective of the
contract is to secure a supply commitment; i.e. the contract structure must induce the input supplier
to enter the market in the first place.
With these considerations in mind, we combine principles of contract theory and real options
to examine how uncertainty and irreversibility affect contracting outcomes in thinly traded,
specialized agricultural product markets. We do so by developing a framework in which the
participation constraint in a complete contract setting is modeled as the solution to a real options
problem faced by the input supplier. The buyer then chooses the amount of each type of payment
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(performance, lump sum, and opportunity cost-indexed) that would maximize profits subject to
the participation constraint.

2.3

The Trading Environment

Our analysis focuses on the formal characterization of mechanism design. This study falls squarely
in the domain of complete contract theory since the contractual form emerges as the result of an
optimization exercise (Wu, 2014). 1 As first suggested by Alexander et al. (2012), for a perennial
energy crop contract to be successful and lead to a transaction between a principal (i.e. “buyer”)
and agent (i.e. “seller”), certain constraints must be met. A contract must satisfy a participation
constraint, an incentive compatibility constraint and a renegotiation proof constraint. The seller
participation constraint deals with the terms of the contract being favorable enough to induce the
seller to produce a given SAP. Incentive compatibility dictates if the seller is motivated to meet
certain quality or output targets. The renegotiation proof constraint mandates that the contract must
provide sufficient incentive for the seller to comply with the agreement over time and not exit
production early to grow alternative crops instead. The principal will write the contract that
optimizes their objective function (maximize profits or minimize costs) subject to these constraints
Alexander et al. (2012). The equilibrium contract emerges as the sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE) of a two-stage game. In the first stage, the principal offers a contract to the
agent who, subsequently, decides to reject or accept the offer.
We make several relaxations to the traditional complete contracting framework to allow for
a larger set of potential solutions. While still accounting for participation, renegotiation and moral

1

There is a distinct difference between a complete contract methodology and a complete contract. The methodology explains how
the problem is viewed. The contract itself explains what is specified ex ante and the outcome of a contract. Comprehensive contracts
specify payment for all future contingencies but are “second best” due to moral hazard. Our problem contains moral hazard. We
use a complete contract method with comprehensive contracts.
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hazard, our model generalizes that used in the Alexander paper in two important ways. Our paper
builds the probability of renegotiation associated with a given contract and any reductions in output
associated with moral hazard into the objective function but does not require a contractual form
that rules out their occurrence.
In developing the model, we aim to capture key empirical features of the contracting
environment while abstracting away from unenforceable contingencies (such as changes in quality)
that can increase, to an extent, ex-post discretionary latitude. We also abstract away from other
empirical features like the choice of buyer plant capacity and total acreage contracted, liquidity
constraints, risk aversion, and uncertainty on policy enforcement. Finally we model the bargaining
process as a take it or leave it offer from the principal. Having to negotiate with hundreds of sellers
would be costly from a transactions perspective. Abstracting away from such issues greatly
reduces the analytical demands of the analysis at little cost of generality. Our analysis develops a
framework in which the participation constraint in a complete contract model is modeled as the
solution to a real options problem faced by the seller.
The goal of this paper is to determine what contract structure, out of pre-specified spectrum
of contract types, will emerge as a SPNE between the buyer and the seller. To define a prespecified spectrum, we use contract mechanisms previously discussed in the literature. All
previous studies (Alexander, et al., 2012, Yang, et al., 2015, Yoder, et al., 2015) concentrated on
contracts that had performance payments and fixed/rental payments. Two of them had payments
indexed to alternative, traditional agricultural product prices (TAPs). Consequently, the primitive
domain of contract types considered in this study consist of combinations of performance payment
(i.e. payment per quantity of a SAP produced), fixed payment (i.e. constant payment independent
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of SAP output) and opportunity cost-indexed performance payment (i.e. payment per quantity of
SAP where SAP price is tied to an alternative TAP price).
The trading environment in which the analysis is based is as follows. An agricultural product
buyer wishes to sign a contract with a seller to procure a specialized agricultural product. The
buyer adds value to this SAP to convert it into a refined agricultural product (RAP), which it then
sells. The buyer can pay a seller any combination of the three previously mentioned payment types.
A performance payment eliminates price uncertainty for the SAP, but still subjects them to
uncertainty in SAP output and the opportunity cost of not growing the TAP. Paying the seller fixed
payments eliminates both price and output uncertainty for the SAP, but still exposes the seller to
opportunity cost uncertainty. Indexing the seller’s performance payment to alternative agricultural
product prices ties the price of the SAP and the TAP (the seller’s opportunity cost) together. This
reduces uncertainty of the opportunity cost for the seller, while creating price volatility for the
SAP. A seller exposed to more volatility through a contract requires higher total payment to enter.
This total payment is the buyer’s input cost. The buyer offers the seller a contract that maximizes
their own expected present value of returns. Based on offered payments, the seller decides between
producing its current TAP or switching to the SAP.
2.3.1

The Buyer’s Problem: “Profit Maximization Subject to Contracting Constraints”

The problem analyzed in this paper is viewed in a complete contract framework. The buyer seeks
to purchase an agricultural product from the seller which the buyer in turn adds value to and
subsequently sells. The buyer’s problem consists of offering contract terms that maximize the
present expected value of the future stream of returns conditional on probability of renegotiation
and moral hazards effects on that profitability, subject to the participation constraint.
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As previously mentioned, the buyer is concerned about having an undisrupted supply of its
SAP. If alternative agricultural products become more profitable than producing the SAP, the seller
may find it optimal to hold up the buyer “ask for more money” or exit SAP production altogether.
This breach of contract could prove costly for the buyer, as it would leave it with idle capacity and
a reduced revenue stream. In a strict complete contracting framework, renegotiation is treated as a
constraint that sets the probability of it occurring in any situation to be zero. Our framework relaxes
this restrictive assumption. It builds the probability of renegotiation associated with a given
contract structure into the buyer’s objective function. It could be worth it for the buyer to take on
some risk of renegotiation if the contract structure leads to a sufficiently low input cost.
In our model, cost per unit of output is calculated as the summation of performance payment
per unit of SAP and fixed payments per acre divided by the output per acre. The output level is
determined in part by seller effort, which is influenced by incentives embedded in each contract.
Because low output makes SAPs cost more for the buyer, traditional complete contracting
methodology treats incentive compatibility as a constraint that must be met within a contract. If
output did not respond strongly to seller effort, it could be beneficial for the buyer to write a
contract allows for moral hazard to develop if the contract leads to a sufficiently low willingness
to accept (WTA) by the seller. The impact of lower output caused by a contract that is not incentive
compatible is built into the buyer’s objective function. The buyer’s objective function and related
seller participation constraint are presented in Equations (1) and (2) respectively.

max
, , ,

∑

!"

(

( , , ,

; , ))

(1)

subject to:
(

#(

, , ,

; )) ≥ '* ( , , ,

; )+ −

(2)
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where (
contracted,

) is the annual return (revenue-operating cost) obtained by the buyer per acre
is performance payment (price per unit of SAP),

participating seller,

is a fixed payment paid to the

is the index strength between opportunity cost and performance payment,

is the payment that the seller must incur if she reneges from the contract,

is a vector of

exogenous parameters affecting the firm’s profits. The endogenously defined variables resulting
from the form of the contract offered (i.e. probability of renegotiation and if incentives are
compatible) are denoted
(

#

and the contract length .

) is the present expected returns obtained by the seller per acre for producing the

SAP under the contract terms ( , , ,

), and

is a vector of exogenous parameters affecting

the input sellers profits and levels of volatility. '* denotes the seller’s willingness to accept per
unit of output produced under the contract terms ( , , ,

), '* includes the sellers option

value of waiting and endogenously responds to the structure of contract being offered. The
implications of including this option value are discussed in the following section. We denote the
output of the SAP, + , and the operating cost of producing the SAP

. If the seller expects to be

paid more per unit of SAP than their WTA per unit to switch, they will grow the SAP. If not, they
continue to grow the traditional agricultural product.
2.3.2

The Sellers’s Problem: “Participation Constraint”

A contract must give sufficient premium beyond the costs of switching to induce the seller to
switch from a traditional agricultural product to a specialized agricultural product. This is defined
as the participation constraint and is a key element in this analysis.
In the context of mechanism design, participation constraints are often quite simple. However,
in the context of specialized agricultural products, participation constraints are not as straight
forward given the combination of uncertainty and sunk costs involved in these types of investments.
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Under such conditions, sellers require contract terms that provide sufficiently high premiums to
encourage them to produce SAPs. Since sufficient conditions for entry depend upon the nature of
uncertainty faced by sellers, which in turn are affected by the contract structure, the participation
constraint will vary by contract type. Hence, this constraint needs to be estimated before solving
the seller’s optimization problem.
Before setting up the complete contract problem, it is necessary to retrieve the seller’s
participation constraint. The seller’s problem follows that considered by Song et al. (2011). In our
model, a risk neutral seller has the option of allocating a given acre of land to a TAP or producing
a SAP. The seller may convert back and forth between these two uses by paying a fixed cost (
where

)

denotes the starting product ( ∈ (*, ) ), where T and S represent traditional and

specialized agricultural products respectively, and j represents the crop grown after conversion
( ∈ (*, )). We treat revenue from TAPs (

) and SAPs (

) as stochastic variables, where

( )

denotes revenue for product i in period t.2
The stochastic process is modeled:

=

where

( , )

+

( , )

;

= *,

(3)

( , ) is the drift rate associated with the revenue for a given product,

volatility of revenue for that product, and

( , ) is the

is an increment of a Weiner process. Prices and

outputs for both products are stochastic. Additionally these two processes may be correlated by
the following relationship:

2 This paper diverges from Song’s and uses revenue rather than return for the stochastic variables to allow for greater flexibility
in the contract that can be offered.
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(

)=

where

(4)

is the correlation coefficient between

and

. These variables by construction will be

correlated under any contract that offers opportunity cost indexing since prices of both products
will move in the same direction.
Over an infinite time horizon, the seller wants to maximize the discounted value of the stream
of payments they receive ( ), minus switching costs (Fackler, 2004). Mathematically,

(

) = max{ ( )

,

( +

),

( +

−
) −

+

(+

+

),

( +

) ,

}

(5)

where the discount rate is denoted , the operating cost for a given product is denoted
payment for a given product is denoted

, and fixed

. Fixed payments will always take a value of zero for

traditional agricultural products since this analysis focuses on contracting for specialized
agricultural products. Brekke and Øksendal (1994) have proven that the previous value function is
optimized when it fulfils two conditions:

(

, )−

,

( )+

−

≥ 0,

= *,

(6)
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, )=

,
(
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)−∑
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(

,

−
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−

(

, ) (

, )

and
,

≥

; ,

∈ (*, ) and ≠

(7)
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where subscripts on

denote partial derivatives. Equation (6) states that the value of selling the

project now and investing the proceeds,

(

), must be at least as great as the current period

,

profitability plus current period appreciation in the project. Equation (7) states that the value of the
current state must be at least as high as the value of the alternate state minus any cost of switching.
One or both of these conditions will hold with equality. If Equation (6) holds, it is optimal to stay
in the current state. If Equation (7) holds, it is optimal to switch from product to product . If they
both hold, the seller is indifferent between switching and not. This is the point where the trigger
revenue for conversion is recovered. Since this problem looks at two-way conversion, there will
be two different equalities for Equation (6) to satisfy, and two for Equation (5): going from a TAP
∗

to an SAP and going from an SAP to TAP. These trigger revenues are denoted

and

∗

respectively. The seller’s participation constraint (willingness to accept per unit) (iso-entry surface)
∗

for a given contract is recovered as the summation of the

and

divided by SAP output for

that contract.
2.3.3

Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)

The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this dynamic game is a contract (
∗

(

such that (

,

∗

,

∗

,

∗

; , )) = max ∑
, , ,

!"

(

( , , ,

∗

,

∗

,

∗

,

∗

),

; , )). Since

the firms’ profit maximizing contract is defined by the tangency between iso-profits and the isoparticipation surface faced by the buyer, Equation (2) should hold with equality at the SPNE; i.e.
(

#(

∗

,

∗

,

∗

,

∗

; )) = '* (

∗

,

∗

,

∗

,

∗

; )+ −

. It wouldn’t be beneficial

for the buyer to offer the seller more than their WTA in this take it or leave it offer.
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2.3.4

Comparative Statics of Interest

Once we have found the SPNE contract terms for a given set of parameters we want to examine
its structural response to varying levels and sources of uncertainty and irreversibility. Given the
complexity of interactions among contract terms along the iso-entry surface, we do not have strong
priors regarding the expected sign of these partials. This, ultimately, underscores the fact that
the endogenous response of the contract structure to changes in primitives and its implications for
return distribution along the vertical supply chain are fundamentally an empirical question. Having
said that, Table 2.1 displays our (weak) prior expectation on the effect that changes in important
primitives would have on the resulting contract structure.
Table 2.1: Contract Structures Expected Response to Changes in Primitives
Primitive
TAP uncertainty (

)

SAP uncertainty ( )
Irreversibility (

)

Performance
payment ( ∗ )

Lump sum
payment ( ∗ )

Index strength
( ∗)

∗

=0

∗

=+

∗

∗

∗

=+
∗

∗

=+

=+
=+

∗

∗

=+
=+
=+

EPV buyer profit (
(

∗

(

∗

(

)
)

∗

)

∗

)

=−
=−
=?

Generally speaking, the interaction of uncertainty and irreversibility increases the option value of
waiting. Therefore, we expect that increases in the levels of any of the three primitives of interest
would, all else equal, cause the input supplier to require a higher performance payment to induce
entry. Both higher levels of input supply volatility
levels of lump sum payments in equilibrium,

∗

and irreversibility

should lead to higher

. Lump sum payments are used to insulate the

seller from the output volatility of the specialized product. We do not expect lump sum payments
to effectively protect the seller from volatility in opportunity cost of the specialized product.
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Therefore, there is no obvious reason to expect a first order effect of opportunity cost volatility on
lump sum payments.
With two products that compete for scarce resources (e.g. land and capital), the option value
of waiting is driven by the changes in relative profitability of competing products combined with
costly reversibility. Positively correlating returns from both products should reduce the value to
waiting and reduce the probability of renegotiation. Therefore indexing is expected to increase in
response to increase in volatility (regardless of the source) and irreversibility. The effect of changes
in primitives on exit penalty is ambiguous since, on one hand it would increase the performance
payment required for participation, and on the other hand it would reduce the probability of
renegotiation in the future. The present value of expected returns for the buyer should be
decreasing in both volatilities since it will lead to both a higher premium paid to the seller and a
higher probability of renegotiation.

2.4

Empirical Motivation

While there are numerous thin differentiated agricultural markets that are characterized by the
previously mentioned qualities, it is helpful to narrow the focus to a single market. This helps make
the ideas more concrete by performing the analysis with previously estimated parameters.
Cellulosic biofuel has gained the attention of both policy makers and private industry for its ability
to address climate change, energy security, and domestic job creation. Additionally, it is not
subject to the issues of the food versus fuel debate and poor net energy balance that corn ethanol
is. Despite this existing interest, investment in cellulosic biofuels has not kept pace with policy
targets. For these reasons, we chose contracting for perennial energy crops to empirically motivate
this study. More specifically, we discuss contracting between a farmer (seller) considering growing
Miscanthus and an incumbent cellulosic biofuel plant (buyer).
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The resulting gap between the production targets set forth by the first and second Renewable
Fuel Standards (RFS1 and RFS2) and actual production is apparent across the entire supply chain.
In 2015, 142 million gallons of fuel qualifying as cellulosic biofuel was produced which met the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) revised goal of 106 million gallons, but was well
short of the original goal set in the RFS2 of 3 billion gallons (EPA, 2016). One of the factors that
has led to a drag on biofuel plant investment and subsequent production below mandates is the
unwillingness of farmers to grow perennial crops that are used for cellulosic biofuel production.
The failure of meeting the RFS1 and RFS2, combined with the previously mentioned nature of the
market, has made the intersection of contracting and perennial energy crops a popular area of
research.
Converting an acre of agricultural land to perennial crop production is expensive to initiate,
and is subject to considerable uncertainty on returns in the future. This is especially true for
Miscanthus, which requires expensive rhizomes rather than seeds for planting. In the absence of
contracts, returns from Miscanthus are uncertain due to volatility in yield, price, and opportunity
cost (i.e. returns from growing row crops such as corn and soybeans). Cost-effective policy aimed
at developing this industry requires an understanding of the complex interaction between contract
structure, the farmer’s value to waiting for more information, and contracting considerations.
2.4.1

Empirical Implementation: The Cellulosic Ethanol Plant’s Problem

As previously mentioned, the plant’s problem consists of offering contract terms that maximize
the present expected value of the future stream of returns, subject to the participation constraint.
Specifically the plant wants to maximize the expected present value it receives from contracting
an acre of Miscanthus production. The plant’s problem is displayed in the following two equations:
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Time in years is denoted . The probability of a farmer honoring their contract for in a given year
is denoted

. The selling price of one gallon of cellulosic ethanol, a refined agricultural product

RAP, is denoted

. The ethanol yield per dry ton of Miscanthus is + ,while + is the expected

Miscanthus yield per acre, and

is the ethanol plants operating cost per gallon not including

feedstock cost. The performance payment to the farmer per dry ton of Miscanthus is
payment to the farmer is abbreviated

. Acreage

and the discount rate is denoted . Feedstock cost is the

summation of acreage, and performance payments. The plant writes a contract that is attractive
enough to induce farmer entry which is displayed in Equation (9).The plant makes a take it or
leave it offer to the farmer that falls exactly on the farmer’s iso-entry line.
2.4.2

Empirical Implementation “Farmer’s Problem”

As previously mentioned, to recover the participation constraint to solve the plants problem it is
necessary to calculate the farmer’s WTA for growing Miscanthus under every possible contract
structure. In the context of this problem the fixed price performance payment is a payment to the
farmer per dry ton of Miscanthus produced, opportunity cost indexed performance payment ties
Miscanthus price to corn and soybean (row crop) price. Fixed payment, is a yearly acreage
payment paid to the farmer independent of yield.
Several complications exist to solving the farmer’s two way, regime switching real options
problem. The first being that computational effort grows exponentially with the dimension of the
function that is being interpolated. This is defined as the curse of dimensionality (Miranda and
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Fackler, 2004). Due to this concern, our previously mentioned stochastic variables defined in
Equation (1) are explained by revenue rather than price and yield separately. Revenue is a
stochastic variable constructed from combining the separate volatilities associated with yield and
price through the use of historical data. This greatly simplifies the problem.
The second, value functions for this problem are not homogenous of degree one, and both
states have option values that are tied to the other. Due to both of these considerations, no analytical
solutions exists for this two variable problem (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, Fackler, 2004, Schmit, et
al., 2011, Song, et al., 2011). This necessitates the use of more complex numerical methods to
solve the problem and retrieve the trigger values for entry and exit into Miscanthus and row crop
production. For this analysis, the collocation method is used to estimate the value functions and
set up an extended vertical linear complementarity problem (EVLCP), which is solved using the
Newton method (Fackler, 2004, Miranda and Fackler, 2004, Song, et al., 2011, Markel, et al.,
2016). The Newton method has the best performance characteristics for solving this type of
EVLCP problem compared to other alternatives such as Lemke based algorithms and Successive
Over-Relaxation (Fackler, 2004). For mathematical details of estimating the value functions for
Equations (4) and (5) using collocation, re-writing the problem as an EVLCP and solving using
the Newton method refer to Appendix A, and for a thorough explanation of solving 2 variable
regime switching models numerically using collocation and the Newton method see (Fackler,
2004).
Under contracting, the interpretation for entry and exit revenue thresholds are slightly
different for Miscanthus. The farmer is now earning revenue both from performance payments and
acreage payments. Revenue from performance payments is stochastic while revenue from acreage
payments is deterministic. The stochastic variable

can be thought of as performance revenue.
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The yearly acreage payment the farmer is given is determined and held fixed every year. The
farmer then responds to the level of

and strength of

and is triggered into entry or exit from

Miscanthus by a combination of the stochastic variables row crop revenue and the Miscanthus
performance revenue. Essentially, a farmer will convert from row crops to Miscanthus if
Miscanthus is relatively profitable or if row crops are relatively unprofitable. What ultimately
matters is the difference between the two returns. For a more detailed description of this decision
refer to Appendix B.
The farmer’s participation constraint can be thought of as their WTA for growing Miscanthus
or their iso-entry surface for growing Miscanthus. The famer’s participation constraint is recovered
∗

from the trigger revenue for conversion,

. This trigger value is the solution from the real options

analysis using the Smoothing Newton Algorithm. The threshold for switching to row crops,
∗

and for switching to Miscanthus,

∗

,

, will vary depending upon the level of i) revenue for the other

crop, ii) volatility, iii) irreversibility, iv) acreage payment, and v) opportunity cost index strength.
Ultimately the biofuel plant would like to recover the expected cost per dry ton “E[WTA/dt]” for
a given contract. This is accomplished by dividing (
There will be a vector of unique
one single

∗

∗

∗

+

) by expected Miscanthus yield

∈[

]

.

for different levels of corn revenue. We need to choose

, rather than a vector of {

∗

|

} to make comparison possible across different

specifications. The performance payment per dry ton to induce entry into Miscanthus production
∗

for a given contract is calculated as
crops and is equal to $529/

.

∈[

(

)
]

, where (

) is the expected revenue of row
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2.4.3

Data and Parameter Estimation

The following analysis focuses on optimal land conversion on agricultural land in the Indiana. The
farmer can grow an equally balanced rotation of corn and soybeans. Alternatively, they can use
that land to grow Miscanthus. There are two payment choices and levels the plant specifies in the
contract offered to the farmer. The plant decides the size of yearly acreage payment paid to the
farmer,

and the strength of the opportunity cost index used for performance payment .

Conditional on that payment structure along with the size of the exit penalty
require a given amount of performance revenue,

∗

, a farmer will

to induce entry. An index strength of zero

implies a fixed price performance contract (PF), and a strength of one implies an indexed
performance contract (PI) where Miscanthus price is perfectly indexed to corn and soybean prices.
It is important to note that an opportunity cost index strength of one doesn’t imply a correlation
coefficient of one between Miscanthus and row crop returns because it only links prices between
crops. Yields are still uncorrelated under opportunity cost index performance payments. An index
strength of one only leads to a correlation coefficient ( ) of approximately 0.56 between
Miscanthus returns and row crop returns. The contract combinations under consideration for in
this paper are listed in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Different Contract Combinations of Trigger Performance Revenue Under
Different Levels of Acreage Payment and Opportunity Cost Price Indexing Strength

α (Strength of
Opportunity
Cost Index)

$0

$25

$50

…

$800

0

PF

PF,A

PF,A

PF,A

PF,A

0.33
0.66
1

PF,PI
PF,PI
PI

A (Acreage Payment per acre per year)

PF,PI,A PF,PI,A PF,PI,A PF,PI,A
PF,PI,A PF,PI,A PF,PI,A PF,PI,A
PI,A
PI,A
PI,A
PI,A

= Acreage Payment
= Strength of Opportunity Cost Index
PF= Fixed Price Performance Payment = (
*+)
PI= Cost Indexed Performance Payment = (
(row crop prices, α) ∗ + )
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This study also looks at the effect of varying levels of exit penalties (irreversibility) and
volatility (uncertainty) in the stochastic variables effect on the equilibrium contract structure. The
specific combinations of these two considerations are displayed in Table 2.3. To compare all
contracts in all situations, Table 2.2 is embedded in each cell of Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Complete Contracting Considerations
Penalty for Exit
[$ per acre]

Size of Sigma
,

2

,

,2

$0
$1,000
$2,000

The data for production costs of Miscanthus is taken from Yoder, et al. (2015). Data for historical
economics and yields of row crops is based on the United Stated Department of Agriculture
(USDA) Quickstats (USDA, 2016) describing the Heartland region. Historical simulated data for
Miscanthus yields comes from historical weather data in Indiana weather office (Office, 2017) and
assumptions within Yoder, et al. (2015). Price data for ethanol comes from the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA, 2017).
The annualized expected yield for Miscanthus used in this study is estimated to be 7.86 dry
tons per acre annualized. The expected revenue for a corn soybean rotation on low value
agricultural land is estimated at $529 per acre per year. This is the average revenue for farms in
the heartland over the past 20 years (USDA, 2016). Operating costs associated with row crop
production (not including opportunity cost of land) are $299 per acre. Average wholesale fuel price
for ethanol was calculated at $2/−
calculated at $1/−

and cellulosic renewable identification number value was

over the past 10 years. The parameters associated with the cellulosic

biofuel plant including biomass to ethanol conversion rate, non-feedstock operating cost, capital
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cost are 106 gallons/dt, $1.14/gallon, and $6.01/gallon of yearly capacity respectively and are
taken from Gonzalez, et al. (2012).
A Net Present Value (NPV) analysis including all production and opportunity costs for
Miscanthus production recovered an annualized NPV breakeven price of $95/

. These

parameters are adjusted to accommodate the infinite time horizon assumption. Finally, these
annualized and adjusted parameters were used to recover a Marshallian breakeven price for entry,
which was estimated to be $74/

for Miscanthus. This value is used as a comparison price to the

real options results to recover premium on entry. Table 2.4 summarizes all the parameters used in
this analysis.
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Table 2.4: Parameters Used in Real Options Analysis3
Parameters
Standard deviation as a % for
Standard deviation as a % for
“performance fixed” ( =0)
Standard deviation as a % for
“performance cost indexed” ( =1)
Drift rate for
Drift rate for
“performance fixed”
Drift rate for
“performance cost indexed”
Correlation coefficient “performance fixed” ( =0)
Correlation coefficient “performance indexed” ( =1)
Real discount rate
Capital cost to switch from row to Miscanthus
Capital cost to switch from Miscanthus to row (fine)
Operating cost for row crops
Operating cost for Miscanthus
Acreage payment for growing Miscanthus
Indexed opportunity cost strength
Expected yield of Miscanthus (annualized)
Selling price of ethanol
Rin value of ethanol
Ethanol yield per dry ton of Miscanthus
Non-feedstock operating cost of ethanol
Capital cost per gallon of capacity

2.5

Symbol Value

r

A
+
∈

+∈
K

16.5
8.7
23.8
0
0
0
0
.56
5
2,257
[0,1,2]
299
169
[0-800]
[0 − 1]
7.86
1.86
1.48
106
1.14
6.01

Unit

Source

Percent [%]
Percent [%]
Percent [%]
Percent [%]
Percent [%]t
Percent [%]
Coefficient
Coefficient
Percent [%]
$ per acre
$1000 per acre
$ per acre
$ per acre
$/acre/per yr
number
Dry ton/acre
$/gallon
$/gallon
Gallon/dry ton
$/gallon
$/gallon

1
2
1,2
1
2
2
1,2
1,2
3
4
6
5
4
3
3
4
7
7
8
8
8

Results and Discussion

We find the equilibrium contract structure by backward induction. Therefore, we start with the
final stage, which is the farmer’s decision to participate. Participation can be induced under a range
of contract structures. Section 2.5.1. formally characterizes the set of contract terms (performance
payment, acreage payment, opportunity cost-index strength, and renegotiation penalties) that
would make investing in perennial energy crops the solution to the farmer’s optimization problem.

3

1.) USDA (2016) "Quick Stats." In. used 20 years of row crop price and yield data used to calculate drift rate and standard deviation for row crop
revenue using author’s calculations in excel. All drift rates approximating zero were set to zero to make contract interpretations simpler 2.) past
20 years of yield data using simulated yields from equation in (Yoder et al. 2015) and state level weather data for Indiana found at (I.S.C. 2017).
Prices of biomass assumed to be value given in (Yoder et al. 2015) calculations were done by author. 3.) Base assumptions for the paper (Yoder et
al. 2015) and built into single capital parameter by author. All costs within the first two years were included since no harvestable yield occurs until
the end of the second year. 5.) (Dobbins et al. 2017) operating cost includes equipment rental fee but not land rental. 6.) Authors choice for sensitivity
analysis. 7.) (USDA, 2016) 8.) (Gonzalez, et al., 2012).
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This set of contract terms satisfy the contract’s participation constraint. In Section 2.5.2. we
formally characterize the solution to the first stage of the game in which the firm chooses, among
those satisfying the participation constraint, the contract terms that maximize its expected profit.
2.5.1

The Contract’s Participation Constraint

Contract structures are hereby defined by the combination of four parameters: performance
payment denoted by

(total price per dry ton of biomass traded), acreage payment denoted by

(payment per acre planted to perennial energy crops), opportunity cost-index denoted by
of correlation between the price of row crops and performance payment

(degree

), and renegotiation

penalty (lump sum, per acre payment the farmer must incur if she reneges from the contract).
Different combinations of contract terms will induce participation by the farmer. This points to the
existence of an iso-participation surface composed of the least favorable conditions that the firm
can offer the farmer, which can still prompt the farmer’s participation.
This iso-participation surface is computed numerically as described in Section 2.4. Since
graphically depicting a 4-dimensional surface is not feasible, we present two sets of isoparticipation lines. First, Figure 2.1 displays the combination of acreage payments and
performance payments that induce entry (i.e. that secures the supplier’s commitment), under
different levels of opportunity cost-indexing

(changes in

shift the iso-entry lines), and zero

renegotiation penalties. In turn, Figure 2.2 displays the combination of acreage payments and
performance payments that induce entry by the farmer, under different levels of renegotiation
penalties, and zero and full opportunity cost-indexing . It is important to note that the vertical
axis in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 does not only showcase performance payments. The risk-neutral,
incumbent plant cares about the total payment to the farmer for biomass. This expected payment/dt
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Expected Total Payment/dt at Entry

expected total payment per dry ton required to induce farmer entry across different contracts.
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Figure 2.1: Farmer’s Participation Constraint (WTA) under Alternative Contract Structures

Several important insights emerge from Figure 2.1. First, the negative slope of the iso-entry line
can be interpreted as the performance payment reducing effect of acreage payment. Increases in
acreage payment allow the firm to reduce the performance payment needed to induce entry. An
additional dollar spent on acreage based payments will always reduce performance based
payments required for entry by more than one dollar for a given contract. Additionally the
convexity of iso-entry lines indicates a decreasing marginal effect of acreage payment on
performance payment. In other words, along the iso-entry line, increases in acreage payment
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permit larger reductions in performance payment at low levels of the former. This is because as
acreage payments increase, they shift increasingly less risk towards the buyer.
Secondly, as opportunity cost indexing increases, the iso-entry lines become steeper. This
indicates that acreage payments are more effective at reducing performance payments for contracts
that have stronger opportunity cost indices. Interestingly, indexing and acreage payments operate
as complements for relaxing the farmer’s participation constraint. This is because, an increase in
cost indexing unleashes two offsetting forces. First, it reduces the farmer’s risk by at least partially
tying performance payment to opportunity cost so that if row crops become more profitable, so
does Miscanthus. On the other hand, it introduces volatility in performance payment itself, and
just as increases in row crop prices would trigger increases in performance, so will decreases in
row crop prices trigger reductions in performance payment. This increased volatility in Miscanthus
production can then managed through higher acreage payments. High levels of both acreage and
indexing allow the plant to effectively limit both opportunity cost and Miscanthus production
volatility experienced by the farmer. This in turn reduces the farmer’s option value of waiting.
While offering a contract on the iso-entry surface guarantees a supply commitment from the
farmer, the farmer might still renege from such contract in the future if a large enough increase in
the opportunity cost of compliance (i.e. a substantial increase in profitability of row crops) occurs.
If the farmer breaks the contract, the plant may be left with idle plant capacity as there is no spot
market from which the plant can procure additional Miscanthus. Therefore, it is in the firm’s best
interest to secure a reliable supply over time. When a firm is concerned about renegotiation
(contract breach by the farmer), it is possible to write a contract that penalizes the agent for exiting
production before the contract is up. Penalties for exit “

” are used as a means of reducing the

probability of the farmer breaking the contract in the future.
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Figure 2.2 portrays the effects of changes in renegotiation penalties under high and low
indexing. Therefore, this figure not only illustrates the effects of changes in renegotiation penalties
when indexing is kept constant, but also how those effects vary under different levels of indexing.
Specifically, Figure 2.2 shows that, keeping indexing constant, an increase in the penalty raises
the payments (either performance or acreage or both) required to induce the farmer to plant

Expected Total Payment/dt at Entry

perennial energy crops.
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Figure 2.2: Contract Structures Effect on Farmer’s Participation Constraint “WTA” for Biomass
Production under Varying Levels of Irreversibility (Exit Penalties)

Our previous discussion reveals that increased penalties have a cost to the buyer because it has to
offer an improvement in other contract terms to induce the farmer to plant perennials. But the
buyer may be interested in exploiting this tradeoff if it is effective in reducing the probability of
contract breach and, consequently, the probability of a supply shortage. To quantify this benefit of
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penalties, Figure 2.3 displays the probability of renegotiation under the same set of contract
structures plotted in Figure 2.2. More specifically, it shows the probability of a farmer breaking a
given contract any time over a ten year period. Renegotiation represents a future potential cost for

Probability of Renegotiation Over 10 Years

the plant.
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Figure 2.3: Probability of Renegotiation across Contract Types

Several important results transpire from Figure 2.3. First, opportunity cost indexing tends to reduce
the probability of renegotiation. In contrast, higher acreage payment (accompanied by the
corresponding re-adjustment of performance payments to maintain the contract on the iso-entry
surface) increases the probability of renegotiation. Moreover, the effect of changes in these
contract terms interact in non-trivial ways. While higher indexing reduces the probability of
renegotiation under low levels of acreage payment, it can in fact increase it under high levels of
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acreage payment. In addition, while higher acreage payments increase the probability of
renegotiation, the effect is trivial under no indexing, and becomes larger as the opportunity cost
index is strengthened.
Since both indexing and acreage payment reduce the volatility faced the farmer, it seems
counterintuitive that, at high levels of acreage payment, they can both increase the probability of
renegotiation. A reduction in risk associated with the specialized crop, should make the farmer less
likely to breach the contract to grow commodities. However, contracts that reduce the volatility
the farmer is exposed to, reduce the threshold required for switching states in both directions. A
payment scheme that makes it easier for a farmer to switch to Miscanthus will also make it easier
to switch back to corn. Therefore, by removing the value of waiting, contracts that reduce volatility
also make the farmer more likely to change back and forth across alternatives. This in turn,
translates into a higher probability of renegotiation.
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, Figure 2.3 also reveals that if a strict renegotiationproof constraint is introduced in this trading environment (i.e. one that forces the probability of
renegotiation to be underneath a low threshold), the set of contract structures that can emerge in
equilibrium is greatly limited. As revealed by our results, a contract without indexing can never
attain a probability of renegotiation below 10% for the given exit penalty levels. If such probability
is to be reduced to less than 5%, automatically this would impose high levels of indexing, high
levels of penalties, and low levels of acreage payment to the equilibrium contract. This is an
important insight because most analyses of contracting outcomes in agriculture, impose rather
restrictive renegotiation proof constraints and then solve for the equilibrium contract. We divert
from this strategy and build the probability of renegotiation into the buyer’s objective function.
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We do so by tying the probability of renegotiation to the probability of a supply shortage faced by
the buyer and the cost associated with such a scenario.
2.5.2

The Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium Contract

Each contract structure (i.e. a set of contract terms) on the iso-participation surface will result in a
specific expected profit for the plant. The plant is assumed to know the iso-participation surface
and chooses the contract terms, located on that surface, that maximize its expected profit. Figure
2.4 displays the plant’s expected present value of returns from one acre of Miscanthus over a ten
year contract as a function of contract terms (acreage payment appears on the x-axis but other
contract terms shift the curves). We use return (total revenue-total operating cost) rather than profit
due to the fixed nature of the capital investment combined with the life of the plant being longer
than ten years. Maximizing returns is synonymous with maximizing profit. Three envelopes are
displayed in Figure 2.4. Envelopes are drawn under specific and constant renegotiation penalties;
i.e. light grey corresponds to no penalty, dark grey to a $1,000 penalty, and black to a $2,000
penalty. Given the level of penalty, each envelope corresponds to the maximum expected PV of
returns that can be attained at each acreage payment by adjusting opportunity cost indexing.
These envelopes reveal that, given a renegotiation penalty, the plant can increase profits by
increasing both acreage payments and cost indexing up to a point. This insight is interesting since
indexing and acreage payments are often viewed as substitutes of one another. It would appear in
specialized agricultural product markets that at least to a point they behave as compliments for
helping the plant maximize its expected present value of return. Figure 2.4 shows that, when the
contract does not include a renegotiation penalty, maximum return is attained with an acreage
payment of $500 and an index of one. Under a renegotiation penalty of $1,000, maximum profit
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is attained with an acreage payment of $600 and an index of one. Finally, the firm maximizes profit
with an acreage payment of $650 and an index of one under a renegotiation penalty of $2,000.
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Figure 2.4: Present Value of 10 Year Plant Return for an Acre of Contracted Miscanthus
Production under Baseline Volatility Assumptions

Figure 2.4 also reveals that further increases in renegotiation penalties reduce maximum attainable
return (i.e. the peak of the successive envelopes generated). The global SPNE contract structure is
defined by the highest peak. In other words, the SPNE can be computed by building a global
envelope around the individual envelopes displayed in Figure 2.4. Such exercise reveals that the
SPNE contract includes an acreage payment of $600/acre, an expected performance payment price
of $25 per dry ton, an opportunity cost index of one, and an exit penalty of $1,000. These contract
terms reveal that, in equilibrium, the plant absorbs risk by offering a high acreage payment and
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full indexing. In turn, this allows it to lower the expected performance payment. It is worth noting
that the plant can achieve levels of expected return very similar to those of the SPNE by decreasing
(increasing) the renegotiation penalty by $1,000 ($1,000) and also acreage payment by $100
($50).4
It is interesting to note that, in equilibrium, the firm chooses to impose a penalty of $1,000
which forces the firm to offer a higher expected total payment/dt than it could offer if it chose a
zero penalty. But it also decides to limit that penalty to $1,000 and not raise it further. Exit penalties
act as an additional form of irreversibility. All else constant, this additional irreversibility increases
the total payment required by the farmer to grow Miscanthus since it reduces their flexibility to
switch back to corn if prices are high. It also makes exiting Miscanthus production less attractive
for the same reason which reduces the probability of renegotiation. To have a sense of the
magnitude of this tradeoff, for contracts at A=600 and = 1, increasing the penalty from zero to
$1,000 increases expected performance payment price from $22/dt to $25/dt, but at the same time
reduces the probability of renegotiation from 15.7% to 11.3%.
2.5.3

Comparative Statics

This section presents the effect of changes in primitives of interest on the distribution of risk and
returns along the supply chain, considering the endogenous change in contract terms. Since the
defining feature of specialized product markets with large sunk costs is their high volatility, we

4

We also did analysis on the incentive compatibility constraint. In the context of this problem the results were trivial. Moral hazard is going to be
optimal to deal with in all cases but yield losses approaching 0%. The premium saved from going from almost 100% acreage based payments to
completely acreage based payments is very little (WTA is relatively flat at this point under all states and contract specifications) as where the yield
drop off from lack of fertilizer use could potentially bid up total payment per dry ton considerably. In other words, equilibrium contracts would, at
)∗
most, be mostly acreage based but contain just enough performance payment to ensure
∗(
(
) = $28.3. Where $28.3 is the yearly cost of material and application for an acre of fertilizer . Additionally, fully acreage
ℎ
based contracts (when used with indexing) have a relatively high probability of renegotiation which further reinforces using a contract that is not
entirely acreage based.
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focus on the effect of increased volatility. The two main sources of volatility in our empirical
application are Miscanthus yield and prices of row crops. Changes in volatility shift the envelopes
presented in Figure 2.4 and, consequently, the SPNE. The new, endogenously determined contract
terms, will influence the distribution of risk and return along the vertical supply chain.
We first examine the effect of increased volatility on the SPNE contract. In particular we
solve for the SPNE contract under double volatility of Miscanthus yield volatility, and under
double corn/soybean price volatility. These results are reported in Table 2.5. A fully indexed
contract will always be optimal for the plant regardless of relative size and source of volatility.
The size of acreage payment can vary considerably however depending on the source of
uncertainty.
Table 2.5: SPNE Contract under Varying Levels of Volatility
Volatility Scenario
Base
Double Row Crop Volatility
Double Miscanthus Volatility

Acreage
$600
$625
$700

Index Strength
1
1
1

Exit Penalty
$1,000
$0
$2000

Expected PV
$5,901
$5,383
$5,839

Most remarkable is how effective the plant is at handling additional volatility depending on its
source. The plant can handle additional Miscanthus volatility directly, by increasing acreage
payments (by $100) and penalty for exit (by $1,000). The farmer is not exposed to a meaningful
increase in uncertainty and as a result, the plant only experiences a modest decrease in its expected
profitability when Miscanthus volatility increases. On the other hand, the plant is less effective at
responding to an increase in corn/soybean price volatility. When the volatility of row crop prices
increases, the plant responds by reducing the renegotiation penalty (by $1,000) and raising acreage
payment (by $25). Interestingly, acreage payments and exit penalties seem to operate as substitutes
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in response to increased volatility in opportunity cost of Miscanthus price, but they respond as
complements in response to increased volatility of Miscanthus yield. It appears as if a very
moderate increase in acreage payment in response to increased row crop volatility must be
compensated by a reduction in exit penalty to induce farmer’s entry. On the other hand, the increase
in acreage payment in response to Miscanthus volatility is much larger, allowing the firm to
safeguard itself with a higher exit penalty, while still inducing farmer’s entry.
The endogenous changes in contract terms offered by the plant at the SPNE in response to
increased volatility of corn/soybean price are relatively ineffective in cushioning the impact of
increased volatility on the plant’s expected profitability. In fact a doubling of volatility in
corn/soybean prices results in a 10% reduction in expected returns, which is much higher than the
1% reduction in expected returns resulting from a doubling in Miscanthus yield volatility. The
reason behind this asymmetry is that since only price and not revenue is indexed between crops,
indexing has a limited power to safeguard the farmer from volatility on corn/soybean prices.
Therefore, in this situation, the plant has no choice but to increase performance payment to induce
entry, which results in a reduction in expected profit for the plant.
Overall, our results underscore that plant’s may be better equipped to handle multiple sources
of uncertainty if they can write more complex contract with multiple flexible terms (acreage,
performance, indexing, and exit penalties). We should note, however, that the SPNE contract in
our framework is optimal for a risk-neutral plant. Therefore the plant manipulates multiple contract
terms to maximize expected profits. But maximizing expected profits may come at the cost of
higher risk and, particularly downside risk. We explored these potential tradeoffs in more detail
and our results are displayed in Figure 2.5, where we report the cumulative density function (CDF)
of plant’s returns under baseline volatilities, doubled Miscanthus volatility, and doubled row crop
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volatilities. Each CDF corresponds to the SPNE contract structure under each volatility scenario,
as described in Table 2.5.
The total level of volatility that the plant is exposed to does not vary significantly between
the base case and the high Miscanthus volatility case. The plant is able to withstand this additional
volatility by trading away acreage for performance payment, and reduce renegotiation risk with a
higher penalty. As reported in Table 2.5, an increase in volatility of row crops does a significant
negative impact on the plant’s expected profit. Figure 2.5 reveals that the effect of increased row
crops volatility goes beyond expected profits. In fact, it shifts the most of the CDF to the left. On
the other hand, the risk faced by the plant, measured by the coefficient of variation of profits,
shows that the plant is not subjected to higher risk (coefficient of variation is about 0.3 both under
baseline and doubled row crop volatility). Therefore, to induce farmer’s participation, the plant
responds to a doubling in row crops volatility by accepting a reduction in upside profit potential
(shift to the left of the upper portion of the CDF) and keeping the downside risk constant (lower
tail of the CDF remains unaffected). In sum, the plant is strictly worse off since the new probability
distribution of profits is dominated by the baseline distribution in a first order stochastic sense.
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Figure 2.5: Cumulative Density Functions of SPNE Contract under Varying Volatility Levels

2.6

Conclusions and Policy Implications

This study formally characterized the contract structure that emerges in equilibrium in a thinly
traded market where sunk costs and irreversibility are pervasive. The (subgame perfect Nash)
equilibrium contract structure is paramount to the distribution of risk and return along the vertical
supply chain. Therefore, we examine such distribution and how changes in key primitives (changes
in different sources of volatility) affect the endogenous contract terms and, ultimately, risk and
return distribution. Our finding underscore the importance of recognizing the endogenous nature
of the contract structure. As revealed by our comparative statics analysis the equilibrium contract
structure responds in non-trivial ways to changes in model primitives, both in terms of the direction
and magnitude of changes in contract terms. This is particularly relevant to economic analyses of
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cellulosic biofuel markets, as previous studies have either exogenized or ignored the contract
structure altogether.
One of the main lessons drawn from our analysis is that the contract terms respond in
complex ways to changes in market primitives. Our results indicate that lump sum (i.e. acreage)
and performance payments do act as substitutes, as can be expected. However, the results on the
substitutability or complementarity of other contract terms are much more ambiguous. We have
found that lump sum payments and opportunity cost indexing tend to be complements under low
to mid-levels of the former, but substitutes otherwise. Contracts that reduce the volatility that a
farmer is exposed to (those with higher lump sum payments), also reduce the farmer’s value to
waiting for switching states. This lowers the performance payment needed to induce conversion
to the specialized product, but it also reduces the value to waiting for converting back to the
conventional product after the initial switch. For high levels of lump sum payment, the latter effect
dominates the former, resulting in a higher probability of contract breach. A decrease in
opportunity cost indexing offsets this perverse effect of lump sum payments.
Our results also indicate that the source of uncertainty is important for both the equilibrium
contract structure as well as the subsequent profitability and risk exposure of the plant. Relatively
large sources of input supply (i.e. Miscanthus yield) volatility favor higher acreage payments and
lead to the plant taking on increasing amounts of risk with small reductions in profitability. Large
amounts of row crop volatility lead to contracts that pay the farmer higher levels of performance
payments. Consequently, the plant absorbs a similar amount of risk but experiences large
reductions in expected profitability.
These results have a number of implications for the specific empirical market analyzed in
this study. Low fuel prices coupled with substantial premium on entry into feedstock production
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is leading to a lack of investment in cellulosic biofuel production. The USDA’s Biomass Crop
Assistance Program has attempted to address this issue by providing additional incentives to
farmers to grow cellulosic biomass feedstocks, with very limited success (Miao and Khanna, 2017).
These incentives include acreage payments, establishment cost subsidy, and matching payments.
Most of the limited budget is allocated to matching payments (up to $20 per dry ton). Our analysis
offers some rationale for the ineffectiveness of such a policy design. Matching payments do not
reduce uncertainty or irreversibility and thus are the least cost-effective use of government money
to induce entry. Our results suggest that shifting to more acreage payments would be more effective.
Acreage payments not only improve the economics of perennials but also reduce the value of
waiting which in turn reduces the premium required to induce farmer entry.
Our results also indicate that the government can increase the effectiveness of matching
payments, if they are explicitly and strongly correlated to crop/soybean prices. This mechanism
would act as a government-sponsored opportunity cost indexing. Higher correlation index strength
can ease the participation constraint and the risk of renegotiation, which is encouraging to both
trading partners. The power of the opportunity cost index considered in our analysis is limited by
the fact that the price of Miscanthus is correlated to the price of corn and soybeans. This restricts
the correlation between profits to less than one. While moral hazard makes it unlikely that an index
will be written that gives a correlation coefficient between the two returns of exactly one, since it
couldn’t reward or penalize yield, it may be possible to increase the correlation coefficient by
making Miscanthus price a function of row crop profit rather than just row crop price. To curb the
effect of this policy on government spending, a scheme can be implemented whereby the plant
pays the average row crop profit every year and the government pays for the deviation from the
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mean. This policy could be costly for the government in any given year, but over time should be
expenditure neutral and go a long ways in incentivizing perennial energy crop production.
While our discussion has to this point concentrated on the cellulosic biofuels market, it is
important to remember that they are generalizable to other thinly traded agricultural markets. A
few additional examples include McDonald’s historical decision to contract with hog farmer’s to
switch their production to gestation crate free, or their more recent decision to switch to cage free
eggs. Chipotle’s current insistence upon using specialized ingredients that are sustainably and
locally produced, non-gmo and organic are another example of a trading relationship that would
subject the grower to a costly organic certification process that comes with considerably volatility
in future returns. The exact parameters would change but the general effect of uncertainty and
irreversibility on equilibrium contract structure and subsequent profitability and risk exposure may
apply.
Finally, this paper assumes trading between an incumbent buyer and a potential supplier.
Therefore, it focuses on a situation in which entry of the farmer must be incentivized but not entry
of the buyer. While this trading environment fits a number of current markets such as the ones just
discussed and others like cereal manufacturers looking to change to specialized ingredients, it is
less appropriate for a buyer that is also considering entry. Additionally endogenizing buyer’s entry
may be particularly relevant for nascent industries.
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THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIALIZED
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS: CONTRACTING FOR
SIMULTANEOUS BUYER AND SELLER ENTRY

3.1

Introduction

When the buyer must decide whether to enter the market or not (e.g. a cellulosic biofuel plant has
to decide on building a plant), the contract structure should reflect this; i.e. the contract terms must
provide sufficient incentives to the buyer, as well as the seller of the specialized product. In Chapter
2, we only considered the participation constraint of the seller. In this Chapter, we examine
contracts that simultaneously satisfy participation constraints corresponding to both buyers and
sellers. Capturing the more complex principal-agent interactions that emerge in this trading
environment requires extending the previous framework. The sunk costs and uncertainties
associated with entry by the buyer into the specialized agricultural product supply chain complicate
the buyer’s decision. Interaction between irreversibility and uncertainty increases the profitability
of a project necessary to induce buyer entry (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The size and source of
uncertainty and irreversibility dictate how large this premium will be and, in turn, the contract
terms that will satisfy the buyer’s participation constraint.
We follow Chapter 2 of this dissertation and consider a relatively complex contract structure
containing four contract terms: a performance payment, a lump sum payment, an opportunity cost
index establishing a certain correlation between the performance payment and the seller’s
opportunity cost, and a penalty that the seller has to pay if it breaches the contract. We formally
characterize the contract terms that would emerge in equilibrium between an entrant buyer and an
entrant seller of a specialized agricultural product. We do so by expanding the framework from
the previous paper. We add an additional constraint, the buyer participation constraint, to the
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buyer’s optimization problem. This constraint is endogenous; it responds to the buyer’s level and
source of uncertainty associated with a given contract. Contracts exposing the buyer to more
uncertainty increase the buyer’s option value of waiting, and ultimately tighten their participation
constraint. This leads to fewer contractual forms being feasible in equilibrium relative to those
identified in Chapter 2.
Our analysis reveals several findings. First, the equilibrium contract structure is sensitive to
changes in the buyer participation constraint. A tightening buyer participation constraint leads to
more performance payments, fewer acreage payments, less indexing, and decreased seller exit
penalties. Second, the contract structure associated with a given SAP market may change as the
industry matures. We predict nascent industries for SAPs will form under contracts that are
primarily performance payment based. The buyer participation constraint relaxes post buyer entry;
this creates a trading environment that favors contracts containing more acreage payments and
stronger indexing. In other words, a risk neutral buyer takes on additional risk through the contract
in order to take advantage of more favorable feedstock cost as their participation constraint is
relaxed. This occurs until the SPNE contract resulting from an endogenously defined buyer
participation constraint (essay two) converges to the SPNE contract resulting from an exogenously
defined buyer participation constraint (esay one). Therefore, our results reveal an interesting fact.
The contract between a potential seller and an incumbent buyer can be seen as a particular case of
a more general contract between two potential entrants, when the participation constraint of the
buyer is non-binding. This points to an advantage of incumbent buyers over potential entrants
which effectively becomes a barrier to entry into the SAP supply chain.
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3.2

Literature Review

The literature for this paper overlaps the first. In addition to that, we also explore buyer’s response
to uncertainty and irreversibility as well as the use of a buyer participation constraint in contracting.
3.2.1

Endogenous Buyer Participation (The Option Value of Waiting)

The buyer desires to buy a SAP input to add value to and sell as a refined agricultural product
(RAP). This often requires a largely irreversible investment in capital equipment with stochastic
future returns. This interaction of uncertainty and irreversibility creates a premium on entry (Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994). This premium on entry for buyer investment in specialized agricultural
product markets has been a popular area of research, particularly for biofuels. Studies find the
premium on entry for biofuel plants to be 48-208% (Hossiso and Ripplinger, 2016, Markel, et al.,
2016, McCarty and Sesmero, 2015, Schmit, et al., 2009). These studies establish the general
importance of uncertainty and irreversibility in shaping the buyer’s decision to produce a RAP.
They do not however explore contracting’s effect in shaping and responding to these same
uncertainties. The buyer’s decision to enter could be quite sensitive to contract structure.
3.2.2

Buyer Participation Constraint (in SAP Contracts)

Laffont and Martimort explain that for a participation constraint to be satisfied, it must provide the
party considering it a return that is at least as high as the return of their opportunity cost (Laffont
and Martimort, 2009). For contracting problems, it is necessary to focus on the most relevant
constraints to the problem while omitting or simplifying unimportant ones. The constraints that
matter largely depend on the market structure. The contracting literature for specialized
agricultural products often treats the buyer participation constraint as a given e.g. (Alexander, et
al., 2012, Du, et al., 2017, Larson, et al., 2008). The buyer wants to maximize their expected profit
of producing a RAP. SAP inputs are regionally constrained and the type of product these firms
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produce is fixed; this means the buyer has few outside options and therefore opportunity cost is
not a major factor. In this case buyer participation can be omitted. Exogenously imposed buyer
participation is the assumption of paper one where a cellulosic biofuel plant has already entered
production. This capital is very output specific, and the input very regionally constrained; adding
a buyer participation constraint complicates the problem without providing any additional intuition.
When the buyer has options outside the contract, the contract in question must also provide
them with a return that is at least as high as the return of their opportunity cost (Wu, 2014). The
buyer in this paper does have an opportunity cost to contracting with a seller. They could instead
stay in their idle state while maintaining the option to invest in the future. From the buyer’s
perspective, a contract must not only be attractive enough to satisfy Marshallian entry criteria, it
must also be attractive enough to also cover their opportunity cost of waiting for more information.

3.3

The Trading Environment

We focus on the formal characterization of mechanism design. The buyer wishes acquire a
specialized agricultural product from a seller; the buyer then adds value to this SAP and sells it as
a refined agricultural product. In this two-stage game, the principal (buyer), offers a take it or
leave it contract to the agent (seller). The seller subsequently accepts or rejects it. The key
difference of this paper from the previous is that the buyer has not already invested in capital;
buyer and seller are simultaneously considering entry. We add an additional constraint to address
this, the buyer participation constraint. Including a buyer participation constraint portrays
problems within nascent SAP industries, where both the seller and buyer require a sunk cost
investment to enter production. The buyer writes a contract that maximizes their expected
profitability subject to both seller participation and buyer participation constraints; he does so
while accounting for probability of seller renegotiation and moral hazard. This additional buyer
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participation constraint can limit the number of feasible contracts in equilibrium, and subsequently
the SPNE contract structure. The contract mechanisms considered include, performance payment,
acreage payment, opportunity cost indexing, and exit penalties.
3.3.1

The Buyer’s Problem: “Profit Maximization Subject to Contracting Constraints”

The buyer seeks to maximize expected return in the same way it did in paper one, except that it
must now also satisfy its own participation constraint that requires a premium beyond zero
economic profit to induce entry. This premium changes in response to contract structure. The
buyer’s objective function, seller participation constraint, and buyer constraint are presented in
equations 10,11, and 12 respectively.
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In Equation (10), the buyer writes a contract that maximizes their expected present value of returns
over its duration. Equation (11) states that the yearly return a seller receives for growing the SAP
must be at least as great as their endogenously defined WTA for a given contract minus their
operating cost. Equation (12) denotes the buyer’s participation constraint where,

is the expected

feedstock performance cost per dry ton associated with a given contractual form. The term
represents acreage payment per dry ton paid to the seller. Together these terms constitute total
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the buyer’s endogenously defined willingness to pay (WTP) for feedstock being greater than their
expected payment for feedstock are feasible solutions. '* is recovered from the endogenously
defined solution to the buyer’s real options regime switching problem explained in equations 1318.
If the buyer can incentivize seller entry for less than his own WTP to acquire biomass, the
buyer builds the plant and enters production. If not, they continue to wait in their idle state. It
would not be beneficial for the buyer to offer the seller more than their WTA for a given contract;
an equilibrium contract will fall on the seller’s WTA line '* (
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Compared to essay one, the participation decision is the same for the seller but changes for
the buyer. The amount of uncertainty and irreversibility a buyer is exposed to affects their
willingness to pay for biomass. The buyer experiences two general sources of uncertainty, price
uncertainty and yield uncertainty. The RAP selling price, and the RAP operating cost randomly
evolve over time. The yearly yield of the SAP used as an input to produce a RAP also randomly
evolves over time. Contractual form transfers SAP price and SAP yield uncertainty between the
seller and buyer.
For the buyer, fixed price performance payments paid to the seller reduce total price volatility
by holding feedstock-operating costs fixed. Acreage payments increase total price volatility,
because high SAP yields make feedstock cost per dry ton low while low SAP yields make
feedstock per dry ton high. Opportunity cost indexing’s effect on price volatility depends on both
the link between input and output prices it establishes, and its contribution to feedstock price
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volatility. An index reduces total price volatility if it establishes positive correlation between
feedstock prices and output prices without bringing in excessive additional feedstock price
volatility. An index increases total volatility if it establishes negative correlation between input
and output prices or excessively raises feedstock cost volatility.
Capital designed to process specific agricultural products, can be highly specialized. This
makes the investment partially irreversible (Hossiso and Ripplinger, 2016, Markel, et al., 2016,
McCarty and Sesmero, 2015, Schmit, et al., 2009). This interaction of uncertainty and
irreversibility causes a premium on entry for the buyer. The more volatility a buyer is exposed to,
the greater their premium on entry, and the less they are willing to pay to acquire their input. The
buyer’s participation decision is additionally affected by the seller’s probability for renegotiation
associated with a given contractual form. Contracts with higher probabilities of renegotiation,
reduce the buyer’s WTP for biomass.
The buyer’s participation problem is an idle state/active state regime-switching problem
(Fackler, 2004). A risk neutral buyer considering entry has the option of staying in its currently
idle state “0” where it earns no revenue and pays no costs, but retains the option for entering into
production in the future. It can instead enter an active state “1” by making a fixed investment

"

,

to build a plant. The plant upgrades the specialized agricultural product input into a higher value
refined agricultural product output and sells it. An active plant has the option to exit production of
this RAP by selling the plant and receiving a fraction of its initial capital investment,

"

to return

to the idle state if economics become sufficiently unfavorable.
The stochastic variables of interest include, return per dry ton of SAP input converted to RAP
output,

=

+ −

+ −

. Where

denotes the selling price of the RAP, + is the quantity

of RAP output produced per one unit of SAP input,

is non-feedstock operating cost of refining
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each unit of SAP input, and

denotes the performance payment per unit paid to the seller.5 The

second stochastic variable is SAP feedstock yield + . Both stochastic variables follow the process:
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( , ) is the drift rate related with a given stochastic variable,

where

that variable, and

( , ) is the volatility of

is an increment of a Weiner process.

Over an endless time horizon, the buyer maximizes the discounted value of their expected
payments (

) conditional on the weighted probability of the contract being honored over time,

minus switching costs (Fackler, 2004). Mathematically,
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. Brekke and Øksendal (1994) have proven

that the previous value functions are optimized when they satisfy Equations (16)-(18):
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where:

Return would technically be
− since acreage payment paid to farmer is an additional source of operating
cost. However, by construction is independent of SAP yield and therefore was treated as a fixed parameter instead
of being included in the stochastic variable .

5
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represent partial derivatives. The interpretation of Equations (16)-(18) is the

same as Equations (6) and (7) in Chapter 26. Conversion to the active state triggers when the
+ becomes sufficiently high for a given contract structure. These trigger

combination of
values are represented

∗

and + ∗ and vary across contract structure. The buyer’s participation

constraint (WTP for SAP feedstock) is found by finding the feedstock cost associated with a given
∗

and + ∗ across all contract types,

=
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where,

is the expected feedstock

performance cost per dry ton that induces entry for a given contract.
3.3.2

The Seller’s Problem: “Participation Constraint”

The seller participation constraint is treated exactly the same as it was in paper one.
3.3.3

Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)

The SPNE contract resulting from this dynamic game is structured (
SPNE contract
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The firms’ most profitable contract is defined by the tangency between the sellers participation
constraint, and the buyer’s iso-profit line; Equation (11) holds with equality for the SPNE Contract;

6

Paper two has an extra equation since the idle state and active state look sufficiently different that general notation
was not appropriate to describe
. Equation four stood for two equations as well, it was just written more
concisely.
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. The buyer would not

offer the seller more than her WTA for a take it or leave it deal.
3.3.4

Comparative Statics of Interest

Once we have found the SPNE contract terms for a given set of parameters, we want to examine
its structural response to varying shifts (relaxations) of the buyer participation constraint and
shocks to uncertainty. The following section describes the parameters we are interested in
conducting comparative statics on as well as our prior expectations for what should occur. The
value of an active project
project

"

(profit flow plus the option value of future exit), the value of an idle

(the option value of entry), and the cost of switching states

",

govern the buyer’s

investment decision. The buyer invests once the forgone revenue from waiting becomes greater
than the opportunity cost of not keeping the option for investment open (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
The total volatility the buyer is exposed to,
Increasing

increase both

"

and

( ,

, + ), is increasing in both

and .

since options are worth more in volatile environments.

Increases in volatility more strongly affect

"

since its entire value is option based. This means

different contracts with the same expected feedstock cost may experience different opportunity
costs of investment. When opportunity cost becomes too high for a given contract, investment is
no longer possible even if the associated feedstock cost is attractive. State values general response
to uncertainty is displayed in Figure 3.1. Projects containing no volatility have no value for waiting
(either to invest or exit). As volatility increases however, the probabilities of negative economic
returns post-investment increases. Waiting to invest at a premium insulates from this downside
risk and drives the option value for investing

".

Even with identical feedstock costs, certain

contractual structures (with low σ) may be feasible while others with (relatively high σ) are not.
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Figure 3.1: Value of Idle State and Active State in Response to Volatility.

We assume the current empirical situation of cellulosic biofuels experiences seller WTA that is
higher than buyer WTP across all contract structures, otherwise the supply chain would already be
developed. Either upward shifts in WTP or downward shifts in WTA would be necessary to
develop the supply chain. A large enough shift in buyer WTP (e.g. $160/dt) would make all
contractual forms feasible and the buyer participation constraint would not be binding. Table 3.1
displays the expected changes in SPNE contract structure and expected buyer return that occurs in
response to vertical increases in WTP.
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Table 3.1: Contract Structures Expected Response to Changes in Buyer WTP
Buyer Constraint
Position

Performance
payment (

∗

)

Lump sum
payment (

∗

Index strength
)

(

∗

)

Exit penalty
(

EPV buyer return
∗

∗

)

Base WTP
Upward shift in
WTP of $40/dt
Upward shift in
WTP of $80/dt

∗

'*

=?

∗

'*

=?

∗

'*

≥0

∗

∗

'*

≤0

'*

≥0

Upward shift in
WTP of $120/dt
Upward shift in
WTP of $160/dt

Changing contract terms effects buyer and seller premium on entry since they transfer uncertainty
between both parties. A contract that exposes a seller to little revenue uncertainty is a contract that
passes that uncertainty to the buyer in the form of feedstock cost and vice versa. The relative
response between the buyer and seller to additional uncertainty effects equilibrium contract
structure; we also have several prior predictions about SPNE contract structure that should hold
regardless of the interaction of WTA and WTP.
The buyer should not be less profitable as WTP increases. A higher WTP means that more
contracts are available that satisfy both seller and buyer participation. With more options, the buyer
should be at least as well off. The opportunity cost index should not get any weaker as buyer
participation is relaxed. When buyer participation is non-binding for all contract terms (essay one),
= 1. Opportunity cost index strength may stay the same across all increases in WTP but it
shouldn’t decrease.
Predicted in acreage payments and performance payments are dependent upon the buyer’s
and seller’s sensitivity to uncertainty. If the buyer is less responsive to increases in volatility than
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the seller, the closest WTP comes to WTA is under high acreage and low performance payment
contracts. If the buyer is more responsive to increasing volatility than seller, the closest WTP
comes to WTA is under low acreage and high performance payment contracts. Exit penalties
affect seller WTA by changing the irreversibility a seller is exposed to, exit penalties affect buyer
WTP by affecting how likely it is for a contract to be broken in the future. The movement in
size will largely depend on the shape of WTA vs WTP across contract types.
Changes in the volatility of key market primitives will likely also affect the SPNE contract
structure. Table 3.2 displays our week prior expectation on the effect of a changing return volatility
on the resulting contract structure.
Table 3.2: Contract Structures Expected Response to Changes in Return Uncertainty
Primitive

Performance
payment (

Return uncertainty (

)

∗

∗

)

=+

Lump sum
payment (
∗

∗

Index strength
)

=−

(

∗
∗

)

EPV buyer
profit (

∗

)

∗

=?

=−

Contracts that expose a buyer to more uncertainty should increase their opportunity cost of
investing and tighten their participation constraint allowing less contracts in equilibrium; that
should weakly reduce plant profitability. Acreage payments should decrease under higher return
volatilities while performance payments should increase. The effect on indexing depends on the
correlation it establishes between feedstock costs and selling prices.
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3.4

Empirical Motivation

As in Chapter 2, we apply our conceptual framework to the cellulosic biofuel supply chain. We
focus on this example because it is of great relevance from a policy standpoint. The policy
implications of our findings are the focus of Chapter 4 and build on the framework developed here.
It focuses on simultaneous Miscanthus farmer-cellulosic ethanol plant entry. The domestic
cellulosic biofuel industry currently has approximately 54 million gallons a year of capacity and
seven operational plants (Ethanol Producer Magazine, 2018). In contrast with Chapter 2 where
pre-seller entry was the modeled situation, this chapter focuses on both pre-buyer and pre-seller
entry. Based on the conceptual framework developed in this chapter, we not only characterize
contracts for supply chain formation, but further elucidate what contracts persist as the industry
matures. We show that contract terms, and consequently the distribution of risk and return along
the vertical supply chain, change over time with a distinct pattern. This is important to understand
as it affects government policy and future barriers to entry.
3.4.1

Empirical Implementation: the Cellulosic Ethanol Plant’s Problem

The farmer’s empirical problem and the cellulosic biofuel plant’s objective function remain
unchanged from paper one. The difference occurs in the addition of the buyer participation
constraint. This single buyer participation constraint can effect SPNE contract structure in trivial
ways and is the focus of this section. A potential cellulosic ethanol plant wants to maximize its
expected return; it signs a contract with a Miscanthus farmer if a contractual form exists that
simultaneously satisfies the farmer’s and plant’s participation constraint. This problem is
represented in Equations (19)-(21) respectively.
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As with the farmer, it is necessary to recover the buyers participation constraint to solve the plant’s
problem. We calculate the biofuel plant’s WTP for its feedstock Miscanthus under all possible
contract structures. This paper considers the same mechanisms as paper one, performance payment
per dry ton of Miscanthus, opportunity cost indexing to row corn/soybean prices, fixed acreage
payments for a farmer that decides to grow Miscanthus, and farmer exit penalties for breaking the
contract.
The buyer’s regime switching real options problem is afflicted with the same complications
of the farmer’s. The buyer is subject to the curse of dimensionality (Miranda and Fackler, 2004).
This is why refined agricultural product return is a composite of four variables, rather than biofuel
selling price, biofuel operating cost, performance payment to farmer, and conversion rate of
Miscanthus to ethanol being treated as four separate stochastic variables. This makes the problem
simpler.
Due to the contracting considered for this problem that violates homogenous of degree one
value functions, no analytical solutions are possible with two variables (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994,
Fackler, 2004, Schmit, et al., 2011, Song, et al., 2011). This requires more intricate numerical
methods to solve. We use the collocation method; we estimate the value functions and then produce
an extended vertical linear complementarity problem. We solve the EVLCP using the Newton
method (Fackler, 2004, Miranda and Fackler, 2004, Song, et al., 2011, Markel, et al., 2016).
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For the cellulosic biofuel plant to satisfy its participation constraint and be willing to enter
production, the combination of their return per dry ton of converting Miscanthus to ethanol and
Miscanthus yield they are able to acquire becomes sufficiently high to overcome the option value
of waiting associated with a given contract structure. The option value and subsequent WTP
associated for each contract structure is recovered using a two-variable, two state real options
optimal switching model. Four vectors of trigger values are recovered from the plants real options
problem. These trigger values are the solutions to the real options analysis. Combinations of
Miscanthus yield and plant return per dry ton that induce investment into the active state are
denoted +

∗

and

∗

. Combinations of Miscanthus yield and plant return per dry ton that

incentivize exit to the idle state are denoted + " ∗ and

"

∗

.

The plant’s participation constraint is recovered by first finding the one return per dry ton
that triggers entry when Miscanthus yield is at its expected value of + =7.86 dry tons/year,
(

∗ |+

+ −

∗

= + ). Once we have the relevant
+ −

∗

=

, we recall what the return variable,

. We then substitute in the current biofuel selling price per gallon

=$3.32/gallon , the conversion rate for one dry ton of biomass to gallons + =106 gallons/dt, and
non-feedstock operating cost per dry ton
+ −

+ −

∗

=$1.14/gallon into

∗

and are left with

=

. Re-arranging terms allows for the recovery of feedstock performance payment

that becomes low enough to support entry

∗

=

+ −

+ −

∗

. Combining that term with

the acreage cost per dry ton we are recover biofuel plant’s WTP for biomass, =

∗

+

∗

. The

biofuel plant then offers the SPNE contract conditional on WTP being greater than WTA for the
equilibrium contract structure.
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3.4.2

Empirical Implementation: “Farmer’s Problem”

Nothing changes empirically from essay one for the farmer.
3.4.3

Data and Parameter Estimation

The following parameters are for a cellulosic ethanol plant that contracts for a Miscanthus
feedstock. The same contract combinations considered in essay one are considered here (see Table
2.2). The data for production costs associated with cellulosic ethanol is taken from (Gonzalez, et
al., 2012). Data for historical ethanol price is taken from (Bloomberg, 1981). Historical
calculations for the calculated value of cellulosic waiver credits comes from (EPA, 2017).
Table 3.3: Additional Parameters used in this Analysis.
Parameters
Standard deviation as a % for
( = 0)
Standard deviation as a % for
indexed” ( = 1)

Symbol Value

Unit

Source

19.5

Percent [%]

1

37.7

Percent [%]

1

8.7

Percent [%]

2

r

0
0
0
10

Percent [%]
Percent [%]
Percent [%]
Percent [%]

3
3
3
3

"

6.54

$/gallon capacity

4

1.64 $/gallon capacity
[0-800] $/acre/per yr
number
[0 − 1]
7.86
Dry ton/acre
1.45
$/gallon
1.87
$/gallon
3.32
$/gallon
106.35 Gallon/dry ton
1.14
$/gallon

5
3
3
2
1
1
3
4
4

, “feedstock performance price fixed”
, “feedstock performance price

Standard deviation as a % for +
Drift rate for
Drift rate for
Drift rate for +
Real discount rate
Capital cost to switch biofuel plant from idle to active state per gallon
of capacity
Revenue per gallon of capacity for selling plant and exiting production
Acreage payment for growing Miscanthus
Indexed opportunity cost strength
Expected yield of Miscanthus (annualized)
Selling price of corn ethanol
Carbon waiver credit value
Estimated selling price of cellulosic ethanol
Ethanol yield per dry ton of Miscanthus
Non-feedstock operating cost of ethanol

"

A
+
∈

+

7

7
1.) Past twenty years of observed corn ethanol prices added to estimated carbon waiver credit prices(Bloomberg 2018, EPA 2018)), 2.) past 20
years of yield data using simulated yields from equation in (Yoder et al. 2015) and state level weather data for Indiana found at (I.S.C. 2017). 3.
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3.5

Results and Discussion

We find equilibrium contract structure through backward induction. Essay 2 focuses on contracting
to simultaneously induce both buyer and farmer entry. We recover all contracts that induce farmer
participation, we then examine the buyer’s participation decision under the same contracts. The
buyer then chooses the contract that maximizes their expected return, conditional on satisfying
both participation constraints. Section 3.5.1 formally characterizes how the buyer’s participation
constraint responds to characteristics of a given contract structure (performance payment, acreage
payment, opportunity cost-index strength, and farmer exit penalty). Section 3.5.2 examines
changes in the equilibrium contract structure resulting from improved cellulosic biofuel economics
as well changes in buyer uncertainty.
We start by computing the buyer’s participation constraint, which we interpret as the buyer’s
willingness to pay for the SAP (Miscanthus in this empirical illustration). The buyer’s isoparticipation surface responds to the same mechanisms considered in Essay 1, acreage payment,
opportunity cost index strength, performance payment, and exit penalty. The contract terms offered
to the farmer as revenue, reflect feedstock costs for the buyer. Contracts that reduce revenue
uncertainty for the farmer pass on uncertainty to the buyer in the form of feedstock cost volatility
and vice versa. The iso-entry lines displayed in Figure 3.2 represent the most that a buyer would
be willing to offer a farmer in feedstock payment for a given contract structure. These lines
represent the buyer’s willingness to pay for biomass across different contract types. Figure 3.2
examines the buyer participation constraints response to varying levels of acreage payment,
index strength,

embedded in the contract when the farmer’s exit penalty,

shows the combination of

and

and

is zero. Figure 3.3

that induce buyer entry, under different levels of

for low

Author’s assumptions, drift rates were kept at zero to focus on uncertainties effect on contract structure. 4.) Budget for cellulosic ethanol plant
(Gonzalez, et al., 2012), 5.)Assumption for degree of irreversibility for cellulosic biofuel plant (McCarty and Sesmero, 2014)
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and high levels of . The vertical axis in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 shows buyer willingness to pay in
total feedstock cost per dry ton. It is the summation of both the performance payment per dry ton,
and acreage payment per dry ton a biofuel plant would be willing to pay for Miscanthus under a
=

given contract. This WTP per dry ton is
performance payment,

∗

∗

∗

+ ∈ . Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate how the

responds to (A, , and

) and subsequently effects the buyers total

WTP per dry ton across different contract structures. 8
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Figure 3.2: Buyers’ participation constraint (WTP) under alternative contract structures,
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8

When WTP is zero(or low) for large acreage payments the premium on buyer entry is so high that under current
biofuel prices and yields they would only enter for that contract if feedstock where heavily subsidized.

∈
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The negative slopes of the iso-entry lines in Figure 3.2 suggest an additional dollar spent on
acreage payments must reduce the amount spent on performance payments by more than one dollar
to incentivize buyer entry over all levels of acreage payments. Interestingly, opportunity cost
indexing decreases buyer’s WTP for biomass. This is puzzling since corn and ethanol prices have
historically been positively correlated; an opportunity cost index should tie input cost and selling
price together which would act as a natural hedge. This would decrease the buyer’s option value
of waiting, which would increase their WTP. The opposite is true for cellulosic ethanol.
Due to its current under-production, a blender has the option to comply with its D3 credit
mandate by either purchasing D3ethanol/D3 RINs or purchasing D5 ethanol/D5 RIN along with a
Cellulosic Waiver Credit (CWC). This waiver has occurred every year since yearly mandates for
cellulosic ethanol began in 2010. The CWC credits are typically cheaper than the cost of
production for cellulosic ethanol (Skolrud, et al., 2016). This substitutability in compliance
strategy, combined with low cellulosic ethanol production, leads to the price of D5 ethanol plus
the price of CWCs driving cellulosic ethanol prices (Miller, et al., 2013) . The CWC is high in
times of low fuel prices and low in times of high fuel prices. This reduces cellulosic ethanol
revenue volatility, but it also establishes negative correlation between corn/soybean prices and
cellulosic ethanol price. Indexing feedstock cost to row crops creates feedstock cost volatility and
creates negative correlation between revenue and feedstock cost. This increases premium on entry.

Expected Total Payment/dt at Entry (WTP)
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Figure 3.3: Buyers’ participation constraint (WTP) under alternative contract structures,
[$0 − $800], ∈ [0,1] and
∈ [$0 − $2000]

∈

Higher farmer exit penalties make a buyer increasingly willing to enter since they imply a lower
probability of farmer exit in the future. With the relatively high sunk cost a plant experiences upon
entry, this assurance has significant impacts on their WTP across all levels of acreage payment
and exit penalty.
The supply chain will emerge and trading will finally take place if and only if WTP is higher
than WTA under the equilibrium contract terms. We now turn our attention to the comparison
between iso-participation surfaces and the numerical identification of contract structures, if one
exists, that simultaneously fulfill both constraints. The following Figure 3.4a, 3.4b, and 3.4c,
compare farmer and buyer participation constraints across different contract types. They explore
three different scenarios, no market forming, a non-binding buyer participation constraint, and a
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binding buyer participation constraint respectively. If WTP is above the corresponding WTA for
contracts sharing the same , ,

, '* (

∗

, , ,

) ≥ '* (

∗

, , ,

, ) then

that contract structure is included within feasible solution set to the buyer’s optimization problem.
If WTA is above WTP then the contract is removed from consideration. The buyer chooses the
contract within the feasible solution set that maximizes their expected PV of returns. Black lines
denote buyer WTP for a given contract structure and the grey lines represent farmer WTA.
Figure 3.4a. shows the situation in which WTP is less than WTA under all contract scenarios.
In this situation, no SPNE exists and subsequently no transaction occurs. This is the current reality
under existing prices, yields, and parameters. The minimum distance between WTA and WTP
across farmer exit penalties occurs for contracts containing exit penalties of $2,000/acre. Thus are
the exit penalty used in Figure 3.4a.
Several findings emerge from Figure 3.4a. First, the buyer is more strongly affected than the
farmer by acreage payments across all contract types for this empirical situation. Incrementally
increasing acreage payment always reduces buyer WTP more than it reduces farmer WTA. The
second, increasing the opportunity cost index strength has a stronger effect on the buyer than the
farmer across all contract types. A stronger index reduces farmer WTA by a relatively small
amount while decreasing buyer WTP by a larger amount. Finally, the smallest gap between WTP
and WTA occurs for contracts containing no acreage ( = 0) and no indexed payments ( = 0)
and an exit penalty

= $2000. Figure 3.4a shows the findings for a representative farmer and

plant under current prices, technology, and yields. While no equilibrium contract that triggers
formation of the supply chain exists under the current assumptions, differences in biofuel selling
prices, technological innovation, and growing conditions shift their respective iso-entry lines and
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vary over time and location. Numerical comparative statics of the SPNE contract structure with
respect to these primitives are depicted in Figure 3.4b and 3.4c.

Expected payment/dt at entry
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Figure 3.4a: Farmer WTA (grey) and buyer WTP (black) across different contract types
800], ∈ [0 − 1], and
=$2000 when no market forms

∈ [0 −

Figure 3.4b shows a situation in which prices/conversion technology/subsidies increase
sufficiently to put all WTP above the corresponding WTA line. With a non-binding buyer
participation constraint, the equilibrium contract is the same as the one offered in paper one. The
buyer offers the contract that provides the highest expected PV of returns conditional on satisfying
farmer participation. The situation portrayed in Figure 3.4b. is not likely to happen for the
foreseeable future. It does however help illustrate the importance of the buyer participation
constraint under its two polar cases of 1) no SPNE contract supporting supply chain formation
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(Figure 3.4a), and 2) the buyer participation constraint having no effect on SPNE contract structure
(Figure 3.4b). Understanding these two extremes helps illustrate what happens when the buyer
participation constraint rules some but not all contract structures out. That situation is the focus of
Figure 3.4c.
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800], ∈ [0 − 1], and
=$2000 when buyer participation is non-binding

$800

∈ [0 −

71
Figure 3.4c explores what occurs when WTP falls above WTA for select contract terms. Contracts
resulting in WTP being less than WTA are omitted from the figures to clarify which contractual
forms support a transaction between the buyer and farmer. Figure 3.4c display all contracts
possible in equilibrium for increases in the buyer’s WTP of $40/dt, $80/dt and $120/dt respectively.
Only contracts of exit penalty Cmc=$2000 are displayed to keep the graphs clean and they
currently represent the lowest gap between WTA and WTP. Effects of varying exit penalty are
displayed in Figure 3.5. The three figures within 3.4c reveal the subset of contract terms that can
induce formation of the supply chain, in equilibrium under varying WTP by the plant.

Figure 3.4c: Farmer WTA (grey) and buyer WTP (black) across different contract types ∈ [0 −
800], ∈ [0 − 1],
= $2000 and increases (shifts) in buyer WTP ∈ [40,80,120]/
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Increasing WTP increases the set of feasible contract structures to choose from in equilibrium.
Modest increases in WTP, allow contracts containing low acreage payments, low index strengths,
and high exit penalties to be considered. As WTP increases, contracts that contain greater acreage
payments, greater index strengths, and lower exit penalties become feasible. If WTP increases
enough (about $160/dt in this empirical case) all contracts become feasible and the problem
mirrors the one displayed in Figure 3.4b. The degree to which the WTP constraint is binding, has
non-trivial implications for the SPNE contract structure, and is shown in Figure 3.6. Figure 3.5
displays the effect of exit penalty on feasible contract structure when WTP has increased by $80/dt.
(the size of the shift caused by changes in exit penalty is consistent in all three WTP shift scenarios).

Figure 3.5: Farmer WTA (grey) and buyer WTP (black) across different contract types
800], ∈ [0 − 1], and
∈ [0 − $2000] when buyer participation is

∈ [0 −

The buyer’s iso-entry surface is primarily influenced by the size of acreage payment and index
strength; it does also modestly respond to exit penalty. Increasing the penalty for exit relaxes the
buyer participation constraint more than it tightens the farmer participation constraint (from
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= $0 to

= $2000). For instance, raising the exit penalty from $0 to $2000 causes WTP

to intersect WTA at A=$800 rather than A=$650 for an opportunity cost index strength of 0.33.
This modest effect on constraints can have a large effect of the number and type of contracts that
are able to induce supply chain formation.
As previously mentioned, when WTP<WTA for all contract specifications no envelope or
SPNE contract exist that induces formation of the supply chain. When WTP>WTA for all contract
specifications the envelope of available contracts and the SPNE contract are the same as those
derived in Chapter 2 of this dissertation (see Figure 2.4). When WTP is greater than WTA under
select contracts, these constitute the set of contract terms from which the SPNE contract will
emerge. Profits associated with contracts along the willingness to accept surface are displayed in
the three panels of Figure 3.6. The panels present these relationships or profit-rankings for all three
scenarios of the plant’s WTP previously examined in Figure 3.4c.
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Figure 3.6: Expected present value of 10-year plant return for an acre of contracted Miscanthus
production with a binding buyer participation constraint under varying levels of WTP

The level of the buyer participation constraint changes the SPNE contract structure in several ways.
All else constant, a loosening buyer participation constraint (higher WTP) increases the level of
acreage payment in the SPNE contract structure,

∗

≥ 0. An increase in WTP also increases the

level of opportunity cost indexing present along the envelope and within the SPNE
contract

∗

≥ 0. These effects are explained by the fact that contracts that expose the buyer to

more volatility increase their premium on entry, but as their WTP increases they can absorb more
of this volatility. They write contracts exposing themselves to more volatility; this allows them to
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reduce the performance payment (price per ton) paid to the farmer. This trades off makes the plant
more profitable overall.
The plant seems willing to take on more feedstock price and feedstock yield risk in response
to a higher WTP. Interestingly, our results also indicate that the plant favors higher farmer exit
penalties in response to a higher WTP (increasing exit penalties reduce risk rather than increase
it). Figure 3.5 shows farmer exit penalties relax the buyer’s participation constraint more than they
tighten the farmer’s participation constraint. This makes more contracts possible in equilibrium.
We would expect that relaxing the buyer’s participation constraint is most important when few
contracts are possible in equilibrium (low WTP), but we find the opposite. The reason for this is
the size of exit penalty only marginally effects the maximum of expected plant return across exit
penalties; size of exit penalty does however greatly affect the contract type under which the
maximum occurs. Higher exit penalties are paired with higher levels of acreage payment and
stronger indexes. When the buyer participation constraint is included, the last contracts to become
viable are the ones with high acreage payments and strong opportunity cost indexes. A higher exit
penalty offers more contracts but fewer desirable contracts

∈

≥ 0. Charging an exit penalty

only becomes optimal for very high levels of WTP.
Table 3.4 reviews the SPNE contract structure and associated buyer profitability across all
levels of WTP considered in Figure 3.4. A comparison between these results and those of Chapter
2 underscore the key differences between contract terms favored by an incumbent and contract
terms favored by an entrant plant.
A contract written between a buyer and farmer both considering entry can look substantially
different from an incumbent buyer looking to incentivize farmer entry. The inclusion of a buyer
participation constraint reduces the level of acreage payment offered in the SPNE contract and the
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opportunity cost index strength. It additionally makes farmer exit penalties less attractive. This
change in contract structure gives a strategic advantage to an incumbent cellulosic biofuel plant
signing a subsequent round of contracts, over one considering entry into cellulosic biofuel
production. The SPNE contract between a farmer and an incumbent buyer is no longer limited by
the buyer’s participation constraint. Therefore, these plants will sign contracts with a higher
present value of expected profits. The specific mechanism underlying this advantage is that, a
potential entrant plant will pay a higher performance payment to the seller but reduce index
strength and acreage payments to pass on more volatility to the farmer (assuming WTP is high
enough to induce a transaction in the first place).
Table 3.4: SPNE Contract under Varying Levels of Buyer Participation Constraint
Situation
WTP<WTA under all contract structures (figure 3.3.a)
$40/dt increase in WTP (figure 3.3.c)
$80/dt increase in WTP (figure 3.3.c)
$120/dt increase in WTP (figure 3.3.c)
WTP>WTA under all contract structures (figure 3.3.b.)

Contract Structure
No transaction
α=0.33,
=$0
α=0.66,
=$0
α=1,
=$0
α=1,
=$1000

A=$200,
A=$375,
A=$500,
A=$600,

E(PV)

P(ren)

Cost/dt

-

-

-

$5,745

12.4%

$104.03

$5,844

11.9%

$102.30

$5,890

13.0%

$100.17

$5,903

11.3%

$101.05

The biofuel plants’ tendency to pass on risk is explained by the option value of waiting. Waiting
as opposed to taking the plunge and building a plant becomes more attractive as downside risk
decreases, all else constant. In other words, contracts exposing the buyer to the most downside risk
lead to a higher premium (lower WTP) required to induce buyer entry. In this situation the buyer
writes a contract that exposes them to less uncertainty at the expense of raising their feedstock cost
and subsequently making them less profitable. However, the risk-reducing effect of decreased
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acreage payment and index strength more than offsets the negative effect a higher performance
payment when the option of waiting is considered.
While we have been analyzing parallel shifts in the buyer’s iso-entry surface, there are many
plausible circumstances in which the surface would rotate. The slope of the buyer participation
constraint changes when the degree of uncertainty or irreversibility faced by the plant change. This
perturbation subsequently affects the SPNE contract structure. Table 3.5 explores how the SPNE
contract structure changes when biofuel selling price volatility (part of return volatility) is both
twice as volatile and half as volatile as it currently is. Table 3.5 depicts return volatility associated
with no indexing and full indexing after an increase in WTP of $80/dt. We hold everything else
constant to conduct a clean numerical experiment.
Table 3.5: SPNE Contract under Varying Levels of Biofuel Selling Price Volatility
Situation

Contract Structure

E(PV)

P(r)

Half biofuel price volatility
Baseline biofuel price volatility
Double biofuel price volatility

α=1, A=$450, =$0
α=0.66, A=$375, =$0
α=0, A=$0, =$0

$5,876
$5,844
$5,623

11.8%
11.9%
15.9%

Cost/dry
ton
$101.47
$102.30
$105.67

We draw several conclusions from Table 3.5. First, there is a negative relationship between the
degree of volatility faced by the buyer (e.g. biofuel selling price volatility) and how much volatility
the buyer tries to pass onto the seller through the contract terms offered (e.g.

and α). When

biofuel selling price is relatively stable, the plant offers contracts with higher acreage based
payments and stronger indexes. The buyer’s participation constraint tightens as biofuel selling
price volatility increases, the buyer can no longer offer the contracts with the highest expected
returns (high volatility). Finally, in this empirical case, the buyer is mostly concerned about a high
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probability of yearly fluctuations making the plant unprofitable, and relatively less concerned with
a catastrophic event putting the plant out of business.
An important reason underlying our result that the SPNE contract between an entrant plant
and a farmer will shift risk upstream relative to an SPNE contract between an incumbent and a
farmer is that, under baseline parameter values, the plant faces a much higher degree of uncertainty
and irreversibility than the farmer. First, sunk costs are much higher for the buyer. The capital cost
necessary to install an acre of Miscanthus processing capacity (biofuel plant) is approximately two
and a half times as much for the buyer as it is for the farmer (planting Miscanthus). Second,
indexing has an ambiguous effect on the farmer (it increases volatility of profits under Miscanthus
while decreasing the volatility of their opportunity cost of growing Miscanthus), but an
unambiguous, risk-increasing effect on the buyer. This underscores the importance of relative
uncertainty and irreversibility along the vertical supply chain; i.e. uncertainty and irreversibility
faced by the plant relative to that faced by the farmer. It is this relative measure of uncertainty and
irreversibility that seems to underpin changes in the SPNE contract structure.
Figure 3.9 displays the CDF retrieved from Monte Carlo simulations of the plants expected
return from three SPNE contracts resulting from varying biofuel selling price volatilities reported
in Table 3.5 (It does not include capital expenditure since plants often last 30 years and the
contracts modeled are only ten). The biofuel plant takes on the most total volatility (standard
deviation in returns) and most downside risk (largest left tail) when biofuel-selling prices are the
most stable. This allows them to attain the lowest feedstock cost and the highest expected return.
As selling price volatility increases, the buyer’s participation constraint tightens and they
subsequently take on less total volatility and downside risk.

79

Figure 3.7: Cumulative Density Functions of SPNE Contract under Varying Selling Price
Volatility Levels

It is important to note that when comparing the baseline biofuel price volatility (blue) and the case
of half biofuel price volatility (red) in figure 3.9, that while the equilibrium contract structure does
change, the expected present value for the plant remains relatively stable. This occurs despite the
plant taking on slightly more of total risk, and considerably more risk from the farmer. The plant
offsets their loss in selling price volatility by taking on additional feedstock cost volatility. The
reason for this modest response, is that the biofuel plant’s participation constraint in the base
biofuel price volatility case, with an increase in WTP of $80/dt, is not very restrictive. Relaxing
the buyer’s participation constraint further in response to lower biofuel selling price volatility, only
offers a few more contracts just slightly more profitable. Compare figures 3.8 across shifts.
Relaxing the buyer participation constraint has a stronger affect when it is restrictive. For instance,
EPV for baseline biofuel price volatility under a WTP shift of $18/dt is $5,623, and it increases to
$5,786 when the biofuel price volatility is halved. That difference in EPV/acre would increase a
cellulosic biofuel plants expected profitability by approximately $8 million over the duration of
the 10 year contract.
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3.6

Conclusions and Policy Implications

This paper expands on the contribution of paper one by allowing for an endogenously defined
buyer participation constraint. The inclusion of this constraint is non-trivial and lead to SPNE
contract structures that is significantly different in structure from the previous paper. The inclusion
of the buyer participation constraint leads to contracts that have lower acreage payments, lower
index strengths, and lower farmer exit penalties than contracts that did not consider them.
Considering and comparing contracts with and without buyer participation constraints is not
simply an academic exercise. As of 2016, the domestic cellulosic biofuel industry had six plants
in operation (Skolrud, et al., 2016). Developing the industry to the point of being able to meet the
Renewable Fuel Standard mandate requires inducing more investment by both cellulosic biofuel
plants and farmers.
This analysis contains several unexpected results. We predict that the contract structure
between the buyer and plant will diverge from spot markets over time. More specifically,
performance payments are the most similar contract mechanism to spot markets. Contracts with
increasing amounts of other mechanisms such as opportunity cost indexing, acreage payments,
and exit penalties make a given contract look decidedly less like a spot market transaction. This is
contrast to the stylized fact observed in many industries, whereby as the industry matures
transactions increasingly take place in spot markets. The results suggest that this evolution may
occur in the opposite direction. Our analysis reverts these prior expectations and find that
transactions within the cellulosic industry are likely to start with contracts primarily composed of
performance payments before shifting to contracts with high acreage payments index, strength,
and exit penalties.
Another non-intuitive result comes from how unlikely it would be to find a farmer exit
penalty within the SPNE contract structure, once the buyer’s participation constraint is included.
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Including a farmer exit penalty to reduce the probability of renegotiation should gain additional
benefit for the buyer under endogenous buyer entry since the probability of farmer re-negotiation
not only effects the buyer’s expected return but also their ability to enter. The reason for this is
that high exit penalties are most useful under contracts that would otherwise have a high
probability of renegotiation (high acreage and alpha). When these contracts become ruled out it is
no longer worth it for the plant to pay a higher premium to the farmer to reduce the probability of
renegotiation.
Finally, we see a difference in how the buyer responds to both upstream and downstream
uncertainty. Upstream uncertainty from either SAP or TAP revenue can get transmitted to the
buyer through the contract. Specialized agricultural product yields and prices, in addition to
traditional agricultural product prices all effect the buyer’s profitability. The final effect on SPNE
contract structure in these instances is an empirical question dependent upon whether the buyer’s
or seller’s participation constraint is more strongly effected by risk. This strength is governed by
the size of each party’s irreversible capital investment, as well as the level uncertainty they are
exposed to outside of the contract.
On the other hand, the effect of changes in downstream volatility (RAP selling price) is more
straight-forward. A risk-neutral buyer generally tries to take on as much total uncertainty in a
contract as possible (subject to their own participation constraint). They do this to reduce the
seller’s premium on entry and subsequently lower their own feedstock cost. The buyer’s
participation constraint responds to both upstream and downstream volatility. When downstream
volatility increases, the buyer participation constraint tightens. They have no choice but to reduce
the upstream level of uncertainty they are exposed to through the contract. This makes the buyer
less profitable. Once again, it would appear that the buyer is more effective at responding to
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sources of uncertainty that are directly addressed in the contract such as SAP yield, and much less
effective at responding to sources of uncertainty outside of the contract such as RAP selling price.
Cellulosic biofuel is not the only specialized agricultural product market that needs to
simultaneously solve a two party regime switching problem. Many nascent or expanding industries
considering production of specialized agricultural products would have a similar problem.
Wineries are becoming increasingly popular within the United States and are continually
expanding every year. Wineries and the equipment to refine grapes to wine are relatively use
specific and are therefore irreversible to a degree. To secure a specific type of grape defined by
properties such as its varietal, location, or farming practice involved with its production, the winery
must either vertically integrate or contract with a farmer. Vineyards cost thousands of dollars an
acre to establish; they do not bear fruit for several years. Tastes and preferences for specific grape
varietals change over time. If the opportunity cost of growing another varietal becomes too high,
the farmer must dig up what they have and plant again. This type of problem would also apply to
a bio-pharmaceutical firm and a pharmaceutical crop farmer considering entry. These firms would
have to contract with a farmer who, would have to pay for a costly certification. The firm itself
would have to conduct costly research to develop a plant based pharmaceutical.
Vertical coordination occurs in response to thin markets; contracting is not the only type of
vertical coordination available. Vertical integration is another widely adopted way of solving this
problem. A study conducted by Viana and Perez find that both contracting and vertical integration
are common within Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol industry (Viana and Perez, 2013). The corn ethanol
industry within the U.S. has shifted from vertical integration to increasingly contract heavy over
time. Endogenizing firm boundary would more fully explain decision making for SAP markets
and will be a topic of future research.
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The uncertainty faced by the buyer substantially increased under opportunity cost indexing.
The empirical reality of the cellulosic ethanol industry means opportunity cost indexing causes a
negative correlation to develop between ethanol selling price and feedstock cost. If the D3 blending
requirement held, corn prices and biofuel selling prices would become positively correlated. Paper
thee explores the implications for SPNE contract structure this would have.
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CELLULOSIC BIOFUEL POLICY TOOLS: WHAT
MATTERS FOR COST EFFECTIVE SUPPLY CHAIN FORMATION?

4.1

Introduction

Investment in the cellulosic biofuel supply chain is weak despite numerous government mandates
and incentives; what will it take to expand production? The Second Renewable Fuel Standard
establishes a 16 billion gallon a year blending requirement for cellulosic biofuel in the United
States by 2022. It also pushes the price for cellulosic ethanol over $1.00 a gallon higher than its
energy equivalence. The Biomass Crop Assistance Program pays cellulosic crop farmers an
additional $20 per dry ton for two years. Despite these incentives, the domestic cellulosic biofuel
industry capacity is less than 54 million gallons per year, with seven operational plants (EthanolProducer-Magazine, 2018).
This paper makes two contributions. The first, we measure the effect of government policy
tools on the cellulosic biofuel industry investment while accounting for the complex interaction
between contracting and the value of waiting. The second, we find the minimum-cost tool for
expanding cellulosic ethanol capacity while accounting for the same interaction. We examine the
effect of different policy tools on the Miscanthus farmer’s and cellulosic ethanol producer’s
participation constraints using the framework developed in Chapter 3. We then use costeffectiveness analysis to predict the least cost policy tool for expanding cellulosic ethanol capacity.
The policy tools considered include production subsidies, establishment subsidies, and lump sum
payment subsidies. We consider application of these policy tools to both the farmer and cellulosic
biofuel plant.
Our analysis highlights several discoveries. First, the party who receives a subsidy makes a
great difference for the subsidies effectiveness. Subsidies paid to the biofuel plant support supply
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chain formation for less than half the cost subsidies paid to the farmer require. Second, we find
that the most cost-effective policy tool is lump sum subsidy payments to the plant. The government
can induce supply chain development by paying the biofuel plant a yearly lump sum payment of
$5 for every dry ton of processing capacity it builds. These results have important implications for
existing policy within the cellulosic biofuel industry and suggest that alternative strategies exist
that would be more cost effective at incentivizing supply chain formation.

4.2

Literature Review

Cellulosic biofuel has the potential to reduce

emissions, grow rural jobs, and enhance national

security. Cellulosic energy crops grow on a wider variety of land than sugar-based energy crops
such as corn; this means cellulosic energy crops displace less food production. These potential
benefits have fueled interest in cellulosic biofuels from both the public and private sector for
almost two decades. Companies such as Cargill, DSM, and DuPont each invested millions of
dollars in cellulosic biofuel research and/or plant construction (Schnepf and Yacobucci, 2010).
The federal government has policies supporting the production of cellulosic biofuels. The First
Renewable Fuel Standard, Second Renewable Fuel Standard, and the Biomass Crop Assistance
Program (BCAP) being the most prominent. Cellulosic biofuel is also a popular area of research
within many branches of academia. Despite this support, the adoption of this technology is not
widespread. Cellulosic ethanol capacity within the U.S. is currently only 53 million gallons per
year, with seven operational plants (Ethanol-Producer-Magazine, 2018).
The U.S. government implemented the First Renewable Fuel Standard in 2005 and updated
it with the implementation of the Second Renewable Fuel Standard in 2008 (Schnepf and
Yacobucci, 2010). The Second Renewable Fuel Standard mandates a minimum volume of
renewable fuel to blend into the nations fuel supply each year. This policy is implemented through
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the use Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs). When a gallon of renewable fuel is produced,
a RIN is attached to it. A final provisioner of transportation fuel is obligated to either buy the fuel
directly and blend it, buy a renewable identification number from someone else who already has
purchased some renewable fuel, or pay a fine.
The U.S. government implemented the Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP) in the
2008 Farm Bill, renewed it in the 2014 Farm Bill, and is debating it for the 2018 Farm Bill. It has
historically had a $125 million yearly budget to be paid to farmers of cellulosic energy crops. In
principal, farmers growing perennial crops can choose from production subsidies of up to $20/dt
for two years, lump sum payments for five years, or an establishment subsidy that takes the lower
value 50% of the capital cost of establishing an acre of crop or $500 (Miao and Khanna, 2017). In
practice however, most farmers who have participated sold corn stover which only qualifies for
production subsidies as lump sum and establishment subsidies reserved for perennial energy crops.
The widespread support combined with the disappointing performance of cellulosic energy
supply chain development has made the study of governmental policies effect on cellulosic supply
chain development a popular area of research (Boomsma, et al., 2012, Miao and Khanna, 2017,
Ribeiro, et al., 2017, Skolrud, et al., 2016, Song, et al., 2011, Wolbert-Haverkamp, et al., 2014, Yi,
et al., 2017). While valuable contributions to this topic, none of these studies have viewed
governmental policies in a framework that accounts for the complex interaction between the value
of waiting and contracting that are an important component of it.
Numerous existing and potential policy tools exist to support the formation of the cellulosic
biofuel supply chain. The RIN/Carbon Waiver Credit system for cellulosic biofuel and BCAP’s
subsidy payment to farmers per dry ton produced can both be thought of as production subsidies.
Production subsidies effectively make selling price of a given product higher. The effect of
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production subsidies are explored for both the ethanol prices paid to the plant and the Miscanthus
prices paid to the farmer. BCAP’s fixed payments every year for select parties growing cellulosic
biomass can be thought of as a lump-sum payment subsidy. Lump-sum subsidies increase the
expected profitability of a project; they are not tied to output so they limit downside risk associated
with low output. The effect of lump-sum subsidies are explored for both the biofuel plant and the
farmer. The BCAP program also offers establishment subsidies for the farmer. These
establishment subsidies help cover the capital cost of switching states to produce a different
product. Establishment subsidy payments increase the expected profitability of a project; they also
reduce the level of sunk cost required for an investment a party is subject to. The effect of
establishment subsidies are explored for both the biofuel plant and the farmer.

4.3

The Trading Environment

The trading environment in this paper is viewed in the same framework developed in essay two
with one key difference. It adds a third stage to the principal-agent game. This third stage precedes
the biofuel plant offering a contract, which proceeds the farmer accepting or rejecting the offer.
The government chooses a subsidy size and type to offer to either the plant or farmer. The plant
responds to this subsidy when it writes its contract that it offers to the farmer. A governmental
subsidy will shift plant WTP, farmer WTA, or both. This paper builds government payments into
the buyer’s objective function and participation constraint. The plant responds to these incentives
when designing a contract and for making their decision to enter; the farmer also responds to these
incentives when making their decision to enter. The government retrieves the policy type and level
that will induce supply chain investment for the lowest possible cost while satisfying both plant
and farmer participation constraints.
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We wish to account for key empirical features of the policy and contracting environment
while working within computational constraints. More specifically, we do not allow for
combinations of policy tools to be used. Each of the current policy tools considered was modeled
at 15 different levels of payment which required 15 ∗ 8 = 120 simulations. Allowing every
possible combination to be considered would take 15 = 2,562,890,625 simulations and is not
possible under the current model in Matlab. While admittedly not being as rich as a mechanism
design approach that allows for every possible policy combination, our approach still allows for
useful results that give a reasonable estimate of both the size of payment required to induce entry
and the types of payments that are generally more effective.
4.3.1

Government Policies Effect on the Trading Environment

The government has numerous policy tools at its disposal. It can give production subsidies (PS),
lump sum subsides (LS), or establishment subsidies (ES) to either party. The government seeks
simultaneous farmer and plant entry for the lowest possible cost. The government’s decision is
explained with a cost minimization problem, its decision variables are the type and size of policy
tools it uses.
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denotes a vector of exogenous parameters

that affect government payments. As mentioned, these payments can be made to either the plant
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or farmer thus

∈ ( , ) where S and B denote farmer and plant respectively. Equation (23)

represents the participation constraint the government must consider. For a given subsidy tool and
size to be viable it must make the ethanol plants willingness to pay for biomass at least as high as
farmer’s willingness to accept for producing biomass. WTP and WTA both respond to contract
structure,
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). WTP additionally responds to , exogenous parameters affecting

the plant’s profits as well as endogenously defined variables resulting from the form of the contract
offered (i.e. probability of renegotiation and if incentives are compatible) . WTA is additionally
effected by the farmer’s exogenous parameters that affect farmer profitability .
4.3.2

The Plant’s Optimization Problem

We argue that a cost minimization policy tool (
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) will be attractive enough to cause

WTP to become tangent with WTA for one and only one contract structure; WTP will remain
lower than WTA under all other contract structures. The government’s stated goal is the creation
of the supply chain, not welfare distribution; policy tools capable of increasing WTP above WTA
for multiple contracts would mean that the government spends more than necessary to induce entry.
This greatly simplifies the biofuel plant’s optimization problem. The plant offers the contract that
maximizes their profit subject to satisfying both farmer and plant participation constraints, subject
to the policy tool offered by the government. When only one contract structure supports this, the
plant is left with a take it or leave it decision; it can offer the farmer the one contract structure
possible that supports both participation constraints for a given subsidy or not. The buyer’s contract
terms become fixed
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The Cellulosic Ethanol Plant’s Participation Constraint
Before the government can choose its cost minimizing policy tool and structure a take it or leave
it decision for the biofuel plant, they must find the effect of varying policy tools on the participation
constraints. The effect of government payments to the ethanol plant affect plant profitability,
volatility, and/or irreversibility. The same two state, two variable regime-switching problem
solved in paper two is solved here with one key difference. The first the value of an active state
plant will also contain subsidy payments to the buyer.
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The Miscanthus Farmer’s Participation Constraint

Like the biofuel plant, not much changes for solving the farmer’s participation constraint with the
exception being that the Miscanthus producing state for the farmer now contains subsidy payments.
This new reality is displayed in the following equation.
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Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)

The government chooses the policy that induces entry under one specific contract structure. They
choose the single subsidy payment that brings biofuel plant WTP tangent to farmer WTA at
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biofuel plant then chooses to stay idle or accept the government's subsidy (to either itself or the
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farmer). If they accept the subsidy they offer the decided contract structure to the farmer. The
farmer then subsequently accepts or rejects the contract structure and subsidy.

4.4

Empirical Motivation

We extend the conceptual framework developed in essay two to accommodate government policy.
The government desires to expand the existing capacity of cellulosic biofuel from of 54 million
gallons per year to 16 billion gallons by 2022 (Ethanol-Producer-Magazine, 2018, Schnepf and
Yacobucci, 2010). They desire the policy tool that incentivizes simultaneous Miscanthus farmer
and cellulosic biofuel plant entry for the lowest possible cost. We find the size of the policy
payment required to induce investment for production subsidies, lump sum subsidies, and
establishment subsidies paid to either party. We then compare the costs of inducing entry using
these different policy tools. We focus our analysis to targeting the policies to contracts containing
acreage payment=$0, opportunity cost index strength=0, and exit penalty=$2000 (performance
payment will shift depending on farmer WTA). No contract currently exists to support
simultaneous farmer and plant entry without subsidy; we focus on the previously mentioned form
because it minimized the distance between farmer WTA and biofuel plant WTP. Policies targeting
other contract structures with a larger distance between WTA and WTP are more costly.
4.4.1

Empirical Implementation: Government’s Cost Minimization Problem

The government desires to incentivize supply chain development at the lowest possible cost. It can
give production subsidies (PS), lump sum subsides (LS), or entry subsidies (ES) to either party.
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Equation (27) is the government’s objective function. They wish to minimize payment subject to
inducing both buyer and seller entry (Equation (28)). This optimization is relatively simple once
we recover the policy size that induces investment for each policy tool. Recall that the government
recovers these investment-inducing subsidy thresholds for the optimal contract structure of
$0,

∗

∗

= 0,

∗

=

= 2000. This contract structure is optimal in the sense that it represents the

smallest gap between farmer WTA and biofuel plant WTP. Singling out a contract to apply policy
to, greatly reduces the dimensions of the problem and subsequently reduces the computational
demands. We encounter the same problems and use the same methods to recover farmer and buyer
participation constraints as we did in essay two. The one difference is that biofuel plant and
Miscanthus farmer’s participation constraints now also account for policy. Thus WTP is now a
function of (
a function of (
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Empirical Implementation: the Plant’s Optimization Problem

The government chooses the subsidy that supports supply chain formation under one and only one
contract structure (

∗

,

∗

,

∗

,

∗

). This simplifies the biofuel plants optimization problem to a

take it or leave it problem with only one equilibrium contract available to support the transaction.
4.4.3

Empirical Implementation: the Plant’s Participation Constraint

Everything remains the same as essay two with the exception of subsidy payments being built into
the biofuel plants regime-switching problem, see equation 25
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4.4.4

Empirical Implementation: Miscanthus Farmer’s Participation Constraint

Everything remains the same as essay two with the exception of subsidy payments being built into
the Miscanthus farmer’s regime-switching problem, see equation 26.
4.4.5

Data and Parameter Estimation

We recover biofuel plant WTP and farmer WTA for alternative policy tools and sizes of those
policy tools. The policies considered are highlighted in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Policy Tools and Subsidy Sizes under Consideration
Type of Payment
$0/dry ton to $20/dry ton
Size of
Payment $0/acre to $160/acre

$0/acre to $1600/acre

4.5

$0/gallon to $0.19/gallon

$0/acre capacity to $160/acre capacity9

$0/acre to $1600/acre capacity

Results and Discussion

Different government policy tools are capable of inducing entry for both the farmer and the biofuel
plant. The following section explains the level of each tool would required to induce simultaneous
entry and which tool would be the least cost to the government. Recall that government policy
tools shift the farmers and or biofuel plants iso-participation surfaces. Subsidies paid to the plant
increase WTP for biomass and subsides paid to the farmer reduce the WTA to grow biomass. We
calculate the effect of both the type and size of subsidy on iso-participation numerically as defined

9

We wanted to focus on the contractual relationship between the farmer and plant, thus all plant capacity
measurements are measured in capital requirement required to process the expected yearly Miscanthus yield
resulting from one acre of production (7.86 dry tons).
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in Section 4.4. Table 4.2 shows the effectiveness of each type of policy tool at inducing entry and
its cost to government to implement.

Table 4.2: Cost of Incentivizing Entry across Different Governmental Policy Tools
Policy tool

Size of policy at entry

EPV Cost

$0.12 Per gallon

$983

Lump sum to plant

$40/year per acre of capacity10

$400

Establishment subsidy to plant

$550 Per acre of capacity

$550

Production subsidy

$12 Per dry ton

$983

Lump sum to farmer

$96/year per acre

$960

Establishment subsidy to farmer

$1400 per acre

$1400

Production subsidy

to plant

to farmer

The first column defines the policy tool to be used as a subsidy. The second column defines the
payment required under that tool to induce simultaneous buyer and seller entry. The third column
defines the expected cost of this policy to the government. We realize several surprising results.
First, despite historically being the most popular form of support (e.g. BCAP and RIN program)
production subsidies are generally not very cost effective instruments for inducing entry. They
represent the 2nd and 3rd most expensive policy tool for inducing entry. They increase the expected
profitability of the party receiving them which will shift the corresponding iso-participation
constraint but will not reduce the value to waiting which limits production subsidies effectiveness.
Second and perhaps most important, the party receiving the subsidy matters as much as the
type of subsidy being considered. With the exception of production subsides, payments to the
buyer are more than twice as effective as payments to the farmer for inducing entry. There are two
primary factors driving this. One, due to the larger capital investment required to enter production,

10

We wanted to focus on the contractual relationship between the farmer and plant, thus all plant capacity
measurements are measured in capital requirement required to process the expected yearly Miscanthus yield
resulting from one acre of production (7.86 dry tons).
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the plant is more responsive to changes in uncertainty/irreversibility than the farmer. The effect of
decreased downside risk from (yearly lump-sum subsidies) or reducing irreversibility at entry
(establishment subsidies) is more pronounced on an economic agent with a greater value of waiting.
Two, the biofuel plant’s uncertainty and irreversibility is more directly affected through policy
than the farmer. The biofuel plant only has one state that creates uncertainty (the active state) and
only one source of irreversibility (capital investment required to start the plant). The government
directly affects the biofuel plants total uncertainty and or total irreversibility through subsides
aimed at the active state. The farmer is subject to uncertainty both for growing Miscanthus and for
not growing corn and soybeans, the farmer pays both a fixed cost to grow Miscanthus and another
fixed cost to break their contract and leave Miscanthus. With these policies, the subsidies can only
shape uncertainty and irreversibility for growing Miscanthus, they cannot effect the uncertainty
and irreversibility associated with the opportunity cost.
Finally, the most cost effective policy tool at promoting simultaneous biofuel plant and
farmer entry is a yearly lump sum payment directed at the biofuel plant. Lump sum payments do
reduce the probability of a loss in any given year. The majority of an ethanol plant’s total cost
comes from its capital expenditure. The remaining operating cost is primarily tied to output.
Feedstock cost, worker hours, energy, and chemicals are all directly related to how much cellulosic
ethanol is produced. This means that even relatively small lump-sum payments paid to the plant
guarantee that producing ethanol is more attractive than doing nothing once an investment is made.
Lump-sum payments sharply decrease the biofuel plants option value of waiting.
While the government’s primary focus is incentivizing entry and developing the supply chain,
they also desire the industry to stay operational after entry. In other words, they also care about
renegotiation. Table 4.3 compares the probability of renegotiation across the different policy tools
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that induce entry. The first column describes the policy tool, the second column describes the size
of payment, and the third column defines the probability of farmer renegotiation over a ten year
contract subject to its subsidy.
Table 4.3: Farmer’s Probability of Renegotiation across Different Governmental Policy Tools
Policy tool

Size of policy at entry

P(renegotiation)

$0.12 Per gallon

10.24%

Lump sum to plant

$40/year per acre of capacity11

10.24%

Establishment subsidy to plant

$550 Per acre of capacity

10.24%

Production subsidy

$12 Per dry ton

10.24%

Lump sum to farmer

$96/year per acre

10.29%

Establishment subsidy to farmer

$1400 per acre

13.39%

Production subsidy

to plant

to farmer

Due to the low operating cost, high capital cost, and the opportunity cost being a state that receives
no revenue, the plant exiting in the future is unlikely. The farmer however, has relatively high
operating cost, low capital cost, and a valuable alternative state selling row crops. Farmer future
exit is considerably more plausible and is the focus of the probability of renegotiation. Since the
equilibrium contract structure stays the same in all six scenarios and the change comes from the
subsidy, the probability of renegotiation is constant across all subsidies to the plant; subsidies to
the plant only affect plant WTP and won’t change the farmer’s problem in any way.
With the exception of production subsidies, subsidizing the farmer changes the probability
of renegotiation. Giving the farmer an establishment subsidy makes them more likely to exit in the
future. The establishment subsidy makes it easier for the farmer to enter Miscanthus production
but it also reduces sunk cost which makes it easier for the farmer to exit Miscanthus production.

11

We wanted to focus on the contractual relationship between the farmer and plant, thus all plant capacity
measurements are measured in capital requirement required to process the expected yearly Miscanthus yield
resulting from one acre of production (7.86 dry tons).
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This makes an already expensive policy even less attractive. Finally, paying the farmer a lumpsum payment has a very minor effect on increasing the probability of renegotiation conditional on
the SPNE contract structure.
It is important to consider what end of the supply chain is targeted by policy and what the
repercussions are for the other end when designing a policy. In this particular application farmer
renegotiation is of primary concern but in a different industry where the buyer of a specialized
agricultural product had a lower capital cost or a higher opportunity cost their renegotiation should
be considered as well. Additionally the cost minimizing policy tool of

= $400 is still the

preferred tool even when considering probability of renegotiation.

4.6

Conclusion and Policy Implementation

Our most surprising result was how much both the type of the subsidy and recipient of the subsidy
mattered to a tools cost effectiveness. The most effective tool was less than one third the cost of
the most expensive. Entry is most cheaply induced through policy tools that eliminate either
uncertainty or irreversibility. This runs counter to existing policy that is primarily concerned with
production subsidies; the Renewable Fuel Standard increases biofuel selling price through the
implementation of RINs/CWCs and the Biomass Crop Assistance Program primarily pays
production subsidies to the farmer. The cellulosic biofuel mandate of the Second Renewable Fuel
Standard could be both achieved and achieved at a fraction of the cost, if the government switched
to lump sum payments given to the biofuel plant.
The recipient of the payments also matters a great deal. An additional dollar in subsidy shifts
the biofuel plant’s participation constraint considerably more than it shifts the farmers’. It costs
less than half to increase the biofuel plants WTP to become adjacent with the farmers WTA at the
equilibrium contract structure ( = 0,

= 0,

= 2,000) than it does to reduce farmer WTA to
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become adjacent to the plants WTP at the same structure. This is due to the fact that the government
is able to directly affect all of the biofuel plants uncertainty with a lump sum payment, they can
only affect the part of the farmer’s that comes from growing Miscanthus the opportunity cost of
growing row crops is outside of the toolkit available through the public policies considered.
In conclusion, the most cost effective way to induce the formation of the cellulosic biofuel
supply chain is to pay yearly lump sum payments to the cellulosic ethanol plant. These payments
both improve the expected returns to producing biofuel and reduce the option value for waiting to
enter by insulating the plant from downside risk. It is also worth stating that if for non-economic
considerations the government considers subsidy payment to the farmer rather than the plant that
care should be taken to examine the changes in the probability of renegotiation associated with a
given contract. Establishment subsidies increase the probability of renegotiation.
These are the results that hold in the current political environment. If the government would
enforce the blending mandate for cellulosic biofuel and not sell carbon waiver credits as an
alternative, the selling price of ethanol would by rise. This would not cost the government much
money directly but would pass on significant cost to blenders and subsequently consumers.
Alternatively, the government providing economically fair Miscanthus crop insurance or biofuel
production insurance is another potential way of incentivizing entry for low cost. It is already doing
this for traditional agricultural crops (actually better than fair insurance). It is the topic for future
research.
Another topic of future research stems from the policy tools considered. The analysis could
be further enriched by allowing for hybrid policies that include multiple payments as potential cost
minimizing solutions. It is possible that different policy tools could have complex interactions with
one another, making an even lower cost solution possible under that relaxation. Understanding this
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interaction could further aid policy makers in developing the cellulosic biofuel supply chain in the
most cost-effective way possible.
One final limitation of this research is that the government targeted policy to the existing
SPNE contract structure without policy. Specific policy instruments could affect the slope of either
buyer WTP or farmer WTA (see figure 3.5.b). I will argue that for this particular empirical
situation it is not a problem. Production subsidies vertically increase buyer WTP or vertically
decrease farmer WTA by the amount of subsidy per dry ton across all contract types. Lump sum
payments would horizontally shift WTP to the right and WTA to the left depending on if the
payment were to the plant or farmer respectively. Finally, an establishment subsidy would make
both farmer WTA and buyer WTP flatter across all contract types. It would also vertically decrease
farmer WTA and vertically increase buyer WTP for payments made to the farmer and buyer
respectively. Theoretically, a large enough establishment subsidy paid to the biofuel plant could
alter the contract structure in equilibrium if it made WTP flatter than WTA. This however would
require a considerably larger establishment subsidy than is currently required to induce entry.

102
4.7

References

Boomsma, T.K., N. Meade, and S.-E. Fleten. 2012. "Renewable energy investments under
different support schemes: A real options approach." European Journal of Operational
Research 220:225-237.
Ethanol-Producer-Magazine (2018) "U.S. Ethanol Plants." In. Ethanol Producer Magazine.
Miao, R., and M. Khanna (2017) "Limited Impact of Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP)
Under Current Funding Levels." In. Farmdoc Daily.
Ribeiro, L.A., P.P. da Silva, L. Ribeiro, and F.L. Dotti. 2017. "Modelling the impacts of policies
on advanced biofuel feedstocks diffusion." Journal of Cleaner Production 142:24712479.
Schnepf, R., and B.D. Yacobucci. 2010. "Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS): overview and issues."
Congressional Research Service: Washington, DC.
Skolrud, T.D., G.I. Galinato, S.P. Galinato, C.R. Shumway, and J.K. Yoder. 2016. "The role of
federal Renewable Fuel Standards and market structure on the growth of the cellulosic
biofuel sector." Energy Economics 58:141-151.
Song, F., J. Zhao, and S.M. Swinton. 2011. "Switching to perennial energy crops under
uncertainty and costly reversibility." American Journal of Agricultural Economics
93:768-783.
Wolbert-Haverkamp, M., J.-H. Feil, and O. Musshoff. 2014. "The value chain of heat production
from woody biomass under market competition and different intervention systems: An
agent-based real options model." Discution Paper.
Yi, F., C.Y.C.L. Lawell, and K.E. Thome. "The effects of subsidies and mandates: A dynamic
model of the ethanol industry." Working paper, Cornell University.

103

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

There are three key messages resulting from these essays. The first, equilibrium contract structure
is quite sensitive to both the size and source of uncertainty within specialized agricultural product
markets. In general, the buyer will try to shape the seller’s SAP yield uncertainty through acreage
based payments. They will try to shape the seller’s opportunity cost uncertainty through indexing
payments. These mechanisms are most effective at relaxing the farmer’s participation constraint
and inducing farmer entry when they are used as complements.
The second, the buyer prefers to take on as much of the uncertainty within a transaction as it
can through the contract to be able to lower its feedstock cost. If the plant has not already entered
however, it may be forced to push the uncertainty on to the farmer due to its own participation
constraint. This means that equilibrium contract structure is strongly affected by the maturity of a
given SAP market. Markets where the buyer has already entered and is looking to sign a new round
of contracts or produce a new product with its existing infrastructure is generally able to handle
more uncertainty in its contract than a newer market where neither the buyer nor seller has entered
yet. Older SAP industries will generally have higher levels of acreage payments and opportunity
cost indexing than nascent industries.
Third, in the example of cellulosic ethanol, existing government policies are not currently
providing the most cost-effective incentives to induce cellulosic supply chain investment. Two
strategies could make policy more cost-effective. Rather than giving some subsidy to both the
farmer and the biofuel plant, all subsidy payments would have a higher impact if they were
provided to the plant. Rather than favoring production subsidies, lump-sum payments would have
a greater effect at inducing investment due to their ability to decrease the option value of waiting.
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APPENDIX A. ESTIMATING VALUE FUNCTIONS USING
COLLOCATION AND SOLVING USING NEWTON METHOD

The optimality conditions can be re-written to make notation more useful for numerical methods.
Equations (4) and (5) are both captured in equation (10) if the farmer is currently producing row
crops. They are captured in equation (11) if the farmer is currently growing Miscanthus. Equations
(10) and (11) include all 4 optimality conditions:
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These value functions in equations (10) and (11) are not directly observable. They need to
be estimated using the collocation method. The collocation method is a generalization of more
common interpolation methods (Miranda and Fackler, 2004). Collocation chooses ∅ and
make the residual of the optimality conditions zero at n nodes. ∅

,

that

represents a set of n basis

functions from a given family of approximating functions. This paper uses linear splines as the
basis functions. They constitute a series of line sections spliced together at n evenly spaced
breakpoints. Breakpoints are set equal to node values for computational efficiency. Linear splines,
by construction, have derivatives that are non-continuous. The first and second derivative of ∅ are
estimated using finite difference approximation.

is an n vector of estimated coefficients for the

value function associated for a given state (Fackler, 2004). The parameter
combinations of pre-specified nodal values for revenue of row crops ∈ (1,2, . .
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is the estimated value function for a given crop. Re-written in matrix form this

collocation problem can be expressed as:
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The necessary conditions are now written as:
(

) −

,

≥0

=

,

(14)

and
∅

,

−∅

,

+

≥ 0 ; i,j

∈( ,

) and ≠

To estimate , is first estimated using collocation. Φ is an
nodal values.

is defined as the

,

matrix

(15)

matrix ∅
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evaluated at all

evaluated at all nodal values.

is an

1 vector of values for current period revenue evaluated at n nodal values for a given state.
Once the basis functions are specified, the problem is expressed in numerical form, this
problem can re-arranged to form an extended vertical linear complimentarily problem (Fackler,
2004). This EVLCP attempts to find a solution
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This EVLCP is then solved using a smoothing Newton Algorithm. The Newton method has
the best performance characteristics for solving this type of EVLCP problem compared to other
alternatives such as Lemke based algorithms and Successive Over-Relaxation (Fackler, 2004).
Interpretation of two variable solutions are explained in Figure 3.
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APPENDIX B. DESCRIPTION OF TWO VARIABLE SOLUTION

Conversion between crops is triggered by both the profitability of growing a corn soybean rotation
as well as the profitability of growing Miscanthus. A farmer may convert from row crops to
Miscanthus if Miscanthus is very profitable or if row crops are very unprofitable. What ultimately
matters is the difference between the two returns. These differences are denoted as

when

talking about the trigger for conversion between corn to Miscanthus. They are denoted

when

talking about the trigger for conversion between Miscanthus to row crops. Optimality conditions
for the estimated value functions are solved at all nodal values for row crops. This gives the
that induces conversion at each pre-defined
. Hysteresis increases for larger values of
process solves for

. It is then possible to recover
and

by taking

−

. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1. The same

.

Figure 5.1: Boundaries for Conversion under Different

and

under NPV and Real Options

There is a gap in conversion under an NPV analysis due to capital costs that must be covered, but
once





≥

+

the conversion is made under NPV assumptions. This is why the

NPV conversion lines are 45 degrees. Under NPV the scale of
NPV of

−

+

is greater than the expected NPV of

−

or
+

don’t matter. The expected
by a constant amount that
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at least covers
Miscanthus
rotation

. On the other hand, the real options conversion boundary for converting to
, and the real options conversion boundary for converting to a corn-soybean

, fall above (below) their NPV conversion boundaries respectively. The difference in

return must not only cover the capital cost of conversion but also the option value of waiting. This
is also why the line for

and

fall above (below) their respective corresponding NPV

threshold lines and why the lines themselves are not 45 degrees. This paper recovers the specific
entry threshold for Miscanthus under a given contract specification by finding the Miscanthus
revenue that induces entry at the expected corn/bean revenue of $529/acre.
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APPENDIX C. STATISTICAL PROCESS ESTIMATION

To use a real options analysis, revenue for a corn/soy rotation and performance revenue for
Miscanthus, must be modeled to follow appropriate stochastic process’s. The objective is to find
the process that most accurately describes the historical data, and can make the best predictions
for future behavior. For this paper, that stochastic processes specifically considered will be
Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) and geometric mean reversion (GMR). The geometric form
is picked due to revenue of both crops following a log normal distribution, this distribution is
normalized by taking the natural log of it.
Statistical tests can be used to differentiate between a mean reverting or Brownian Motion
stochastic processes. More specifically, the most appropriate process is often chosen by running a
unit root test on historical data to test for non-stationarity of the stochastic variable. This
determines whether the null hypothesis that the variable follows a random walk can be rejected. If
it can, Brownian Motion is not an appropriate approximation for the stochastic variable, and mean
reversion would be more appropriate. If the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is not rejected,
then Brownian motion cannot be ruled out. Depending on the reversion speed, these tests are
typically only reliable when there are 100+ years of historical data (Pindyck, 1999) 12 . It is
important to remember that Brownian motion is a special case of Mean Reversion when the
reversion speed = 0; when the reversion speed is slow or there exists structural changes in the
mean that is reverted to over time GBM is a reasonable approximation (Metcalf and Hassett, 1995,
Pindyck, 1999, Postali and Picchetti, 2006). Mean Reversion will begin to approximate a
deterministic variable for very rapid reversion speeds.
Geometric Brownian Motion is very popular in real option type problems due its relative
simplicity and analytical tractability for many types of problems. GBM assumes that the stochastic
variable follows a random walk where the change in the variable, in this case
the drift rate and the volatility. More specifically, for GBM

=

is dependent upon
+

where t

12
This is the primary row crop revenue and Miscanthus performance revenue are the stochastic variables rather than
row crop profit and Miscanthus profit. There were more historical observations for yields and prices than operating
costs. Operating costs only go back 40 years for corn/soy and do not exist outside of a single budget snapshot for
Miscanthus. Also volatility in the cost of corn soybean production has been relatively low, it only accounts for a yearly
standard deviation within operating cost of less than 7%. In the interest of reliable stochastic testing, its relative static
nature, and using consistent estimation for both variables,
is treated as deterministic for both crops.
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denotes time and
√

.

is the increment of a Weiner Process with a mean of zero unit variance.

=

is a random variable that follows a standard normal distribution. The return this period

is dependent on the return last period plus/minus some random shock.
Mean reversion, and specifically the Geometric Mean Reversion Process, has the advantage
of often being a more realistic assumption in practice. In competitive markets, high prices attract
additional producers which in turn increase supply and lower the price back to the marginal cost
of production. Low prices force some producers out of the market and increase prices back to a
point of zero economic profit for the industry. This is an improvement over the possibility of
infinite profit that GBM allows. Geometric Mean Reversion is defined in the equation
(

−

))

+

. The symbol

=( +

denotes the reversion speed of the stochastic variable

back to the average level. If there is no drift rate, the previous equation can be re-written as
( −

)

+

=

.

A unit root test was conducted on the historical data for both the row crop revenue and fixed
price performance variables. Specifically an Augmented Dickey full test was conducted for both
data series. An Augmented Dickey Fuller test was chosen over a standard Dickey-Fuller test to
correct for any potential auto-correlation in the errors. A unit root “random walk” was rejected at
a 10% but not 5% level for Miscanthus revenue. The reversion speed was calculated to be

=

0.167 and the corresponding half-life was 3.789 years. The results differed for corn/soybean
revenue. We failed to reject unit root at the 10% level, however failing to reject unit root does not
automatically imply the variable follows a GBM, it could just mean the reversion speed is slow
and there is not enough data to reliably reject or fail to reject the unit root. Reversion speed for
corn/soybean revenue was calculated to be

= 0.133 and a half-life of 4.874 years.13 Due to the

low reversion speed, GBM will be the assumption used for both tested variables and performance
revenue as well. The following section discusses where parameters were recovered from.

13

Unit root by construction cannot be rejected at even a 10% level with this reversion speed unless there are at least
94 years of data. Our series consists of only 85 observations.

